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Abstract
We present a new approach to automated reasoning about higher-order programs by endowing sym-
bolic execution with a notion of higher-order, symbolic values.
To validate our approach, we use it to develop and evaluate a system for verifying and refuting
behavioral software contracts of components in a functional language, which we call soft contract
verification. In doing so, we discover a mutually beneficial relation between behavioral contracts
and higher-order symbolic execution. Contracts aid symbolic execution by providing a rich language
of specifications that can serve as the basis of symbolic higher-order values; the theory of blame
enables modular verification and leads to the theorem that verified components can’t be blamed;
and the run-time monitoring of contracts enables soft verification whereby verified and unverified
components can safely interact and verification is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Conversely,
symbolic execution aids contracts by providing compile-time verification which increases assurance
and enables optimizations; automated test-case generation for contracts with counter-examples; and
engendering a virtuous cycle between verification and the gradual spread of contracts.
Our system uses higher-order symbolic execution, leveraging contracts as a source of symbolic
values including unknown behavioral values, and employs an updatable heap of contract invariants to
reason about flow-sensitive facts.Whenever a contract is refuted, it reports a concrete counterexample
reproducing the error, which may involve solving for an unknown function. The approach is able to
analyze first-class contracts, recursive data structures, unknown functions, and control-flow-sensitive
refinements of values, which are all idiomatic in dynamic languages. It makes effective use of an off-
the-shelf solver to decide problems without heavy encodings. Our counterexample search is sound
and relatively complete with respect to a first-order solver for base type values. Therefore, it can form
the basis of automated verification and bug-finding tools for higher-order programs. The approach is
competitive with a wide range of existing tools—including type systems, flow analyzers, and model
checkers—on their own benchmarks.We have built a tool which analyzes programswritten in Racket,
and report on its effectiveness in verifying and refuting contracts.
Prior publications
This paper unifies and expands upon the work presented in the papers “Soft contract verifi-
cation,” inProceedings of the 19th ACMSIGPLAN International Conference on Functional
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Programming (Nguyễn et al. 2014) and “Relatively complete counterexamples for higher-
order programs,” in Proceedings of the 36th ACM SIGPLAN Conference on Programming
Language Design and Implementation (Nguyễn and Van Horn 2015). It also subsumes the
work in the paper “Higher-order symbolic execution via contracts,” in Proceedings of the
ACM International Conference on Object Oriented Programming Systems Languages and
Applications (Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012).
1 Static verification for dynamic languages
Contracts (Meyer 1991; Findler and Felleisen 2002) have become a prominent mechanism
for specifying and enforcing invariants in dynamic languages (Disney 2013; Plosch 1997;
Austin et al. 2011; Strickland et al. 2012; Hickey et al. 2013). They offer the expressivity
and flexibility of programming in a dynamic language, while still giving strong guaran-
tees about the interaction of components. However, there are two downsides: (1) contract
monitoring is expensive, often prohibitively so, which causes programmers to write more
lax specifications, compromising correctness for efficiency; and (2) contract violations
are found only at run-time, which delays discovery of faulty components with the usual
negative engineering consequences.
Static verification of contracts would empower programmers to state stronger properties,
get immediate feedback on the correctness of their software, and avoid worries about run-
time enforcement cost since, once verified, contracts could be removed. All-or-nothing
approaches to verification of typed functional programs has seen significant advances in
the recent work on static contract checking (Xu et al. 2009; Xu 2012; Vytiniotis et al. 2013),
refinement type checking (Terauchi 2010; Zhu and Jagannathan 2013; Vazou et al. 2013,
2014), and model checking (Kobayashi 2009b; Kobayashi et al. 2010, 2011). However, the
highly dynamic nature of untyped languages makes verification more difficult.
Programs in dynamic languages are often written in idioms that thwart even simple
verification methods such as type inference. Moreover, contracts themselves are written
within the host language in the same idiomatic style. This suggests that moving beyond
all-or-nothing approaches to verification is necessary.
Fortunately, contracts themselves give us the tools to enable these new approaches, by
describing values and by partitioning programs on boundaries. We dub our approach soft
contract verification, enabling piecemeal and modular verification of contracts. This ap-
proach augments a standard reduction semantics for a functional language with contracts
and modules by endowing it with a notion of “unknown” values refined by sets of contracts.
Verification is carried out by executing programs on abstract values.
Two crucial ideas from contracts allow us to go from whole-program, first-order ap-
proaches to modular, higher-order contract verification.
• First, contracts as abstract values provide a language of specifications that scales
to higher-order values and can encompass arbitrary specifications. This means that
whatever guarantees a client needs, they can be specified in the interface and handled
by our approach.
• Second, blame to partition programs makes modular analysis possible. In a higher-
order system, behavioral values can flow across module boundaries. Determining
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what a modular analysis means in this setting is tricky, but again contracts provide
the answer. By re-using the concept of blame from Findler and Felleisen (2002),
we define the errors that we rule out as exactly those that blame the portion of
the program under consideration. This crucial distinction will become especially
important when considering the behavior of unknown higher-order values.
To demonstrate the first step in applying our approach, consider the following contrived,
but illustrative example. Let positive? and negative? be predicates for positive and neg-
ative integers. Contracts can be arbitrary predicates, so these functions are also contracts.
Consider the following contracted function (written in Racket (Flatt and PLT 2010)):
(define/contract (f x)
(positive? . → . negative?) ; contract
(* x -1))
We can verify this program by (symbolically) running it on an “unknown” input. Checking
the domain contract refines the input to be an unknown satisfying the set of contracts
{positive?}. By embedding some basic facts about positive?, negative?, and -1 into
the reduction relation for *, we conclude (* {positive?} -1) 7−→ {negative?}, and
voilà, we’ve shown once and for all f meets its contract obligations and cannot be blamed.
We could therefore soundly eliminate any contract which blames f, in this case negative?.
At its core, we rely on a simple idea: symbolic execution naturally breaks down programs
into simpler components, enabling effective reasoning about seemingly-complex features.
This simple approach, building on the two lessons of contracts we have described, is
effective for small examples, but insufficient to scale to realistic programs. In this paper,
we show how the initial approach can handle tricky problems and larger programs by
incorporating several additional techniques.
Solver-aided reasoning: While embedding symbolic arithmetic knowledge for specific,
known contracts works for simple examples, it fails to reason about arithmetic generally.
Contracts often fail to verify because equivalent formulations of contracts are not hard-
coded in the semantics of primitives. Many systems address this issue by incorporating
an SMT solver. However, for a higher-order language, solver integration is often achieved
by reasoning in a theory of uninterpreted functions or semantic embeddings (Knowles and
Flanagan 2010; Rondon et al. 2008; Vytiniotis et al. 2013).
In this paper, we observe that higher-order contracts can be effectively verified using
only a simple first-order solver. The key insight is that contracts delay higher-order checks
and failures always occur with a first order witness. By relying on a (symbolic) semantic
approach to carry out higher-order contract monitoring, we can use an SMT solver to reason
about integers without the need for sophisticated encodings. (Examples in §2.3.)
Flow sensitive reasoning: Just as our semantic approach decomposes higher-order con-
tracts into first-order properties, first-order contracts naturally decompose into conditionals.
If the verification procedure did not take this into account, even simple examples would fail
to verify:
(g : integer? → negative?)
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(define (g x) (if (positive? x) (f x) (f 8)))
This is because the true-branch call to f is (f {integer?}) by substitution, although we
know from the guard that x satisfies positive?.
In this paper, we observe that flow-sensitivity can be achieved by replacing substitution
with heap-allocated values. These heap addresses are then refined as they flow through
predicates and primitive operations, with no need for special handling of contracts (§2.2).
As a result, the system is not only effective for contract verification, but can also handle
safety verification for programs with no contracts at all.
First-class contracts: Pragmatic contract systems enable first-class contracts so new com-
binators can be written as functions that consume and produce contracts. But to the best of
our knowledge, no verification system currently supports first class contracts (or refine-
ments), and in most approaches it appears fundamentally difficult to incorporate such a
notion.
Because we handle contracts (and all other features) by execution, first-class contracts
pose no significant technical challenge and our system reasons about them effectively
(§2.6).
Refuting contracts with concrete counterexamples Generating inputs that crash first-
order programs is a well-studied problem in the literature on symbolic execution (Cadar
et al. 2006; Godefroid et al. 2005), type systems (Foster et al. 2002), flow analysis (Xie and
Aiken 2005), and software model checking (Yang, Twohey, Engler, and Musuvathi Yang
et al.). However, in the setting of higher-order languages, those that treat computations
as first-class values, research has largely focused on the verification of programs without
investigating how to effectively report counterexamples as concrete inputs when verifica-
tion fails (e.g., Rondon et al. (2008); Xu et al. (2009); Kawaguchi et al. (2010); Vytiniotis
et al. (2013); Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn (2012)), or restricted unknown inputs to
first-order (e.g., Kobayashi et al. (2011)). Searching for a counterexample witnessing each
program bug seems futile in the presence of higher-order unknown inputs: after all, the
space of possibilities is huge, and most SMT solvers do not produce models for higher-
order unknown values.
Nevertheless, we recognize that even though there are numerous higher-order inputs,
they trigger program errors in their contexts following only a few specific patterns. There-
fore, instead of searching through the space of all possible functions for a counterexample,
we only consider a small subset of functions of specific shapes. The remarkable result is
that this method enjoys strong guarantees: each counterexample triggers a real contract
violation (soundness), and given an SMT solver that is complete for base data types, our
method constructs a counterexample reproducing each possible contract violation (relative
completeness).
Converging for complex recursion: Of course, simply executing programs has a funda-
mental drawback—it will fail to terminate in many cases, and when the inputs are unknown,
execution will almost always diverge. Simply detecting cycles in the state space handles
straightforward tail-recursive functions, but not more complex recursive calls. Without a
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solution to this problem, even simple programs operating over inductive data would be
impossible to verify.
In this paper, we accelerate the convergence of programs by identifying and approxi-
mating regular accumulation of evaluation contexts, causing common recursive programs
to converge on unknown values, while providing precise predictions (§2.5). As with the
rest of our approach, this happens during execution and is therefore robust to complex,
higher-order control flow.
Combining these techniques yields a system competitive with a diverse range of existing
powerful static checkers, achieving many of their strengths in concert, while balancing the
benefits of static contract verification with the flexibility of dynamic enforcement.
We have built a prototype soft verification engine, which we dub SCV, based on these
ideas and used it to evaluate the approach (§4). Our evaluation demonstrates that the ap-
proach can verify properties typically reserved for approaches that rely on an underlying
type system, while simultaneously accommodating the dynamism and idioms of untyped
programming languages. We take examples from work on soft typing (Cartwright and
Fagan 1991; Wright and Cartwright 1997), type systems for untyped languages (Tobin-
Hochstadt and Felleisen 2010), static contract checking (Xu et al. 2009; Xu 2012), re-
finement type checking (Terauchi 2010), and model checking of higher-order functional
languages (Kobayashi 2009b; Kobayashi et al. 2010, 2011).
SCV can prove all contract checks redundant for almost all of the examples taken from
this broad array of existing program analysis and type checking work, and can handle many
of the tricky higher-order verification problems demonstrated by other systems. In other
words, our approach is competitive with type systems, model checkers, and soft typing
systems on each of their chosen benchmarks—in contrast, work on higher-order model
checking does not handle benchmarks aimed at soft typing or occurrence typing, and vice
versa. In the cases where SCV does not prove the complete absence of contract errors,
the vast majority of possible dynamic errors are ruled out, justifying numerous potential
optimizations. Over this corpus of programs, 99% of the contract and run-time type checks
are proved safe, and could be eliminated.
We also evaluate the verification of three small interactive video games which use first-
class and dependent contracts pervasively. The results show the subsequent elimination of
contract monitoring has a dramatic effect: from a speed up factor of 7 in one case, to three
orders of magnitude in the others. In essence, these results show the games are infeasible
without contract verification.
2 Worked examples
We now present the main ideas of our approach through a series of examples taken from
work on other verification techniques, starting from the simplest and working up to a
complex object encoding.
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2.1 Higher-order symbolic reasoning
Consider the following simple function that transforms functions on even integers into
functions on odd integers. It has been ascribed this specification as a contract, which can
be monitored at run-time.
(e2o : (even? → even?) → (odd? → odd?))
(define (e2o f)
(λ (n) (- (f (+ n 1)) 1)))
A contract monitors the flow of values between components. In this case, the contract
monitors the interaction between the context and the e2o function. It is easy to confirm
that e2o is correct with respect to the contract; e2o holds up its end of the agreement, and
therefore cannot be blamed for any run-time failures that may arise. The informal reasoning
goes like this: First assume f is an even? → even? function. When applied, we must ensure
the argument is even (otherwise e2o is at fault), but may assume the result is even (otherwise
the context is at fault). Next assume n is odd (otherwise the context is at fault) and ensure the
result is odd (otherwise e2o is at fault). Since (+ n 1) is even when n is odd, f is applied to
an even argument, producing an even result. Subtracting one therefore gives an odd result,
as desired.
This kind of reasoning mimics the step-by-step computation of e2o, but rather than
considering some particular inputs, it considers these inputs symbolically to verify all pos-
sible executions of e2o. We systematize this kind of reasoning by augmenting a standard
reduction semantics for contracts with symbolic values that are refined by sets of contracts.
At first approximation, the semantics includes reductions such as:
(+ {odd?} 1) 7−→ {even?}, and
({even? → even?} {even?}) 7−→ {even?}.
This kind of symbolic reasoning mimics a programmer’s informal intuitions which em-
ploy contracts to refine unknown values and to verify components meet their specifications.
If a component cannot be blamed in the symbolic semantics, we can safely conclude it
cannot be blamed in general.
2.2 Flow sensitive reasoning
Programmers using untyped languages often use a mixture of type-based and flow-based
reasoning to design programs. The analysis naturally takes advantage of type tests idiomatic
in dynamic languages even when the tests are buried in complex expressions. The following
function taken from work on occurrence typing (Tobin-Hochstadt and Felleisen 2010) can
be proven safe using our symbolic semantics:
(f : (or/c int? str?) cons? → int?)
(define (f x p)
(cond
[(and (int? x) (int? (car p))) (+ x (car p))]
[(int? (car p)) (+ (str-len x) (car p))]
[else 0]))
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Here, int?, str?, and cons? are type predicates for integers, strings, and pairs, respec-
tively. The contract (or/c int? str?) uses the or/c contract combinator to construct a
contract specifying a value is either an integer or a string.
A programmer would convince themselves this program was safe by using the control
dominating predicates to refine the types of x and (car p) in each branch of the con-
ditional.1 Our symbolic semantics accommodates exactly this kind of reasoning in order
to verify this example. However, there is a technical challenge here. A straightforward
substitution-based semantics would not reflect the flow-sensitive facts. Focusing just on
the first clause, a substitution model would give:
(cond
[(and (int? {(or/c int? str?)}) (int? (car {cons?})))
(+ {(or/c int? str?)} (car {cons?}))] …)
At this point, it’s too late to communicate the refinement of these sets implied by the test
evaluating to true, so the semantics would report the contract on + potentially being violated
because the first argument may be a string, and the second argument may be anything. We
overcome this challenge by modelling symbolic values as heap-allocated sets of contracts.
When predicates and data structure accessors are applied to heap addresses, we refine the
corresponding sets to reflect what must be true. So the program is modelled as:
(cond
[(and (int? L1) (int? (car L2)))
(+ L1 (car L2))] …)
where L1 7→ {(or/c int? string?)}, L2 7→ {cons?}
In the course of evaluating the test, we get to (int? L1), the semantics conceptually forks
the evaluator and refines the heap:
(int? L1) 7−→ true, where L1 7→ {int?}
7−→ false, where L1 7→ {string?}
Similar refinements to L2 are communicated through the heap for (int? (car L2)), there-
by making (+ L1 (car L2)) safe. This simple idea is effective in achieving flow-based
refinements. It naturally handles deeply nested and inter-procedural conditionals.
2.3 Incorporating an SMT solver
The techniques described so far are highly effective for reasoning about functions andmany
kinds of recursive data structures. However, effective reasoning about many kinds of base
values, such as integers, requires sophisticated domain-specific knowledge. Rather than
build such a tool ourselves, we defer to existing high-quality solvers for these domains.
Unlike many solver-aided verification tools, however, we use the solver only for queries
on base values, rather than attempting to encode a rich, higher-order language into one that
1 The call to str-len is safe because (and (int? x) (int? (car p))) being false and (int?
(car p)) being true implies that (int? x) is false, which in turns implies x is a string as enforced
by f’s contract.
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is accepted by the solver. This obviates the need of a general (and error-prone) translation
of the language. For example, there is no need to embed an untyped language’s “unityped
type system” into the solver’s type system.
To demonstrate our approach, we take an example (intro3) from work on model check-
ing higher-order programs (Kobayashi et al. 2011).
; (>/c n) abbreviates (λ (x) (> x n))
(define (f x g) (g (+ x 1)))
(h : [x : int?] → [y : (and/c int? (>/c x))] → (and/c int? (>/c y)))
(define (h x) ...) ; unknown definition
(main : int? → (and/c int? (>/c 0)))
(define (main n) (if (≥ n 0) (f n (h n)) 1))
In this program, we define a contract combinator (>/c) that creates a check for an integer
from a lower bound; a helper function f, which comes without a contract; and an unknown
function h that given an integer x, returns a function mapping some number y that is
greater than x to an answer greater than y—here h’s specification is given, but not its
implementation. (Note h’s contract is dependent.) We verify main’s correctness, which
means it definitely returns a positive integer and does not violate h’s contract.
According to its contract, main is passed an integer n. If n is negative, main returns 1,
satisfying the contract. Otherwise the function applies f to n and (h n). Function h, by
its contract, returns another function that requires a number greater than n. Examining f’s
definition, we see h (now bound to g) is eventually applied to (+ n 1). Let n1 be the result
of (+ n 1). And by h’s contract, we know the answer to (h n) is another integer greater
than n1. Let us name this answer n2. In order to verify that main satisfies contract (>/c 0),
we need to verify that n2 is a positive integer.
Once f returns, the heap contains several addresses with contracts:
n 7→ {int?,(≥/c 0)}
n1 7→ {int?,(=/c (+ n 1))}
n2 7→ {int?,(>/c n1)}
We then translate this information to a query for an external solver:
n, n1, n2: INT;
ASSERT n ≥ 0;
ASSERT n1 = n + 1;
ASSERT n2 > n1;
QUERY n2 > 0;
Solvers such as CVC4 (Barrett et al. 2011) and Z3 (Moura and Bjørner 2008) easily verify
this implication, proving main’s correctness.
Refinements such as (≥/c 0) are generated by primitive applications (≥ x 0), and que-
ries are generated from translation of the heap, not arbitrary expressions. This has a few
consequences. First, by the time we have value v satisfying predicate p on the heap, we
know that p terminates successfully on v. Issues such as errors (from p itself) or divergence
are handled elsewhere in other evaluation branches. Second, we only need to translate
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a small set of simple, well understood contracts—not arbitrary expressions. Evaluation
naturally breaks down complex expressions, and properties are discovered even when they
are buried in complex, higher-order functions. Given a translation for (>/c 0), the analysis
automatically takes advantage of the solver even when the predicate contains > in a complex
way, such as (λ (x) (or (> x 0) E) where E is an arbitrary expression. Predicates that
lack translations to SMT only reduce precision, never soundness.
2.4 Generating higher-order counterexamples
Programmers benefit not only from verification of correct programs, but also refutation
of incorrect programs through concrete counterexamples: they minimize the confusion
between a true bug and a false warning, and provide programmers with insight into their
code’s defects.
In the following program, f’s contract promises that if its argument is a function return-
ing an integer, then f returns an integer. In its body, f performs a division involving the
application of its argument to 42.
(f : (int? → int?) → int?)
(define (f g)
(/ 1 (- 100 (g 42))))
Function f’s definition is unsafe in two ways. First, the division is not protected against
a denumerator of 0. Second, / potentially returns a quotient, causing f to violate the int?
contract in its range.
In this case, the only way function g interacts with the code under verification (function
f) is through its returned value. Because g is applied only to 42 in this case, it suffices to
search for instantiations of g in the space of constant functions of the form (λ (_) n) with
n being an unknown integer. The system therefore can produce two counterexaples trigger
two potential bugs in the program:
Contract violation: f violates contract with /
Value 0 violates contract (not/c (=/c 0))
An example that triggers this violation:
(f (λ (n) 100))
Contract violation: f violates its own contract
Value -1/2 violates contract int?
An example that triggers this violation:
(f (λ (n) 102))
In more complex programs, an unknown function can interact and trigger errors in mul-
tiple ways: either by returning another value to be consumed by the context, or by applying
a function coming from the context to some values. The counterexample can be more
complex, but in each case, it is only how the unknown function interacts with its context that
is relevant to producing a counterexample. The system needs not consider instantiations to
unknown functions that perform irrelevant work, diverge, or have their own errors.
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2.5 Converging for non-tail recursion
The techniques sketched above provide high precision in the examples considered, but
simply executing programs on abstract values is unlikely to terminate in the presence of
recursion. When an abstract value stands for an infinite set of concrete values, execution
may unfold infinitely, building up an ever-growing evaluation context. To tackle this prob-
lem, we summarize this context to coalesce repeated structures and enable termination on
many recursive programs. Although guaranteed termination is not our goal, the empirical
results (§4) demonstrate that the method is effective in practice.
The following example program is taken from work on model checking of higher-order
functional programs (Kobayashi et al. 2011), and demonstrates checking non-trivial safety
properties on recursive functions. Note that no loop invariants need be provided by the user.
(main : (and/c int? (>=/c 0)) → (and/c int? (>=/c 0)))
(define (main n)
(let ([l (make-list n)])
(if (> n 0) (car (reverse l empty)) 0)))
(define (reverse l ac)
(if (empty? l) ac
(reverse (cdr l) (cons (car l) ac))))
(define (make-list n)
(if (= n 0) empty
(cons n (make-list (- n 1))))))
Again, we aim to verify both the specified contract for main as well as the preconditions
for primitive operations such as car. Most significantly, we need to verify that (reverse
l empty) produces a non-empty list (so that car succeeds) and that its first element is a
positive integer. The local functions reverse and make-list do not come with a contract.
This problem is more challenging than the original OCaml version of the same program,
due to the lack of types. This program represents a common idiom in dynamic languages:
not all values are contracted, and there is no type system on which to piggy-back verifi-
cation. In addition, programmers often rely on inter-procedural reasoning to justify their
code’s correctness, as here with reverse.
We verify main by applying it to an abstract (unknown) value n1. The contract ensures
that within the body, n1 is a non-negative integer.
The integer n1 is first passed to make-list. The comparison (= n1 0) non-determin-
istically returns true or false, updating the information known about n1 to be either 0
or (>/c 0) in each corresponding case. In the first case, make-list returns empty. In the
second case, make-list proceeds to the recursive application (make-list n2), where n2
is the abstract non-negative integer obtained from evaluating (- n1 1). However, (make-
list n2) is identical to the original call (make-list n1) up to renaming, since both n1 and
n2 are non-negative. Therefore, we pause here and use a summary of make-list’s result
instead of continuing in an infinite loop.
Since we already know that empty is one possible result of (make-list n1), we use it
as the result of (make-list n2). The application (make-list n1) therefore produces the
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pair ⟨n1,empty⟩, which is another answer for the original application. We could continue
this process and plug this new result into the pending application (make-list n2). But we
instead first approximate ⟨n1,empty⟩ to a non-empty list of positive integers. This approx-
imation choice is guided by the observation that plugging in empty in the recursive call
gives rise to ⟨n1,empty⟩. We then use this approximate answer as the result of the pending
application (make-list n2). This then induces another result for (make-list n1), a list
of two or more positive integers, but this is subsumed by the previous answer of non-empty
integer list. We have now discovered all possible return values of make-list when applied
to a non-negative integer: it maps 0 to empty, and positive integers to a non-empty list of
positive integers.
Although our explanation made use of the order, the soundness of analyzing make-
list does not depend on the order of exploring non-deterministic branches. Each recursive
application with repeated arguments generates a waiting context, and each function return
generates a new case to resume. There is an implicit work-list algorithm in the modified
semantics (§3.8.2).
When make-list returns to main, we have two separate cases: either n1 is 0 and l is
empty, or n1 is positive and l is non-empty. In the first case, (> n1 0) is false and main
returns 0, satisfying the contract. Otherwise, main proceeds to reversing the list before
taking its first element.
Using the same mechanism as with make-list, the analysis infers that reverse returns
a non-empty list when either of its arguments (l or acc) is non-empty. In addition, reverse
only receives arguments of proper lists, so all partial operations on l such as car and cdr
are safe when l is not empty, without needing an explicit check. The function eventually
returns a non-empty list of integers to main, justifying main’s call to the partial function
car, producing a positive integer. Thus, main never has a run-time error in any context.
While this analysis makes use of the implementation of make-list and reverse, that
does not imply that it is whole-program. Instead, it is modular in its use of unknown
values abstracting arbitrary behavior. For example, make-list could instead be an abstract
value represented by a contract that always produces lists of integers. The analysis would
still succeed in proving all contracts safe except the use of car in main—this shows the
flexibility available in choosing between precision and modularity. In addition, the analysis
does not have to be perfectly precise to be useful. If it successfully verifies most contracts
in a module, that already greatly improves confidence about the module’s correctness and
justifies the elimination of numerous expensive dynamic checks.
2.6 First-class contracts
In the following, we choose a simple encoding of classes as functions that produce objects,
where objects are again functions that respond to messages named by symbols. We then
verify the correctness of a mixin: a function from classes to classes. The vec/c contract
enforces the interface of a 2D-vector class whose objects accept messages 'x, 'y, and 'add
for extracting components and vector addition.
(define vec/c
([msg : (one-of/c 'x 'y 'add)]
→ (match msg
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[(or 'x 'y) real?]
['add (vec/c → vec/c)])))
This definition demonstrates several powerful contract system features which we are able
to handle:
• contracts are first-class values, as in the definition of vec/c,
• contracts may include arbitrary predicates, such as real?,
• contracts may be recursive, as in the contract for 'add,
• function contracts may express dependent relationships between the domain and
range—the contract of the result of method selection for vec/c depends on which
method is chosen.
Suppose we want to define a mixin that takes any class that satisfies the vec/c interface
and produces another class with added vector operations such as 'len for computing the
vector’s length. The extend function defines this mixin, and ext-vec/c specifies the new
interface. We verify that extend violates no contracts and returns a class that respects
specifications from ext-vec/c.
(extend : (real? real? → vec/c) → (real? real? → ext-vec/c))
(define (extend mk-vec)
(λ (x y)
(let ([vec (mk-vec x y)])
(λ (m)
(match m
['len
(let ([x (vec 'x)] [y (vec 'y)])
(sqrt (+ (* x x) (* y y))))]
[_ (vec m)])))))
(define ext-vec/c
([msg : (one-of/c 'x 'y 'add 'len)]
→ (match msg
[(or 'x 'y) real?]
['add (vec/c → vec/c)]
['len (and/c real? (≥/c 0))])))
To verify extend, we provide an arbitrary value, which is guaranteed by its contract to be
a class matching vec/c. The mixin returns a new class whose objects understand messages
'x, 'y, 'add, and 'len. This new class defines method 'len and relies on the underlying
class to respond to 'x, 'y, and 'add. Because the old class is constrained by contract vec/c,
the new class will not violate its contract when responding to messages 'x, 'y, and 'add.
For the 'len message, the object in the new vector class extracts its components as
abstract numbers x and y, according to interface vec/c. It then computes their squares and
leaves the following information on the heap:
x2 7→ {real?,(=/c (* x x))}
y2 7→ {real?,(=/c (* y y))}
s 7→ {real?,(=/c (+ x2 y2))}
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Solvers such as Z3 (Moura and Bjørner 2008) can handle simple non-linear arithmetic and
verify that the sum s is non-negative, thus the sqrt operation is safe. Execution proceeds
to take the square root—now called l—and refines the heap with the following mapping:
l 7→ {real?,(=/c (sqrt s))}
When the method returns, its result is checked by contract ext-vec/c to be a non-negative
number. We again rely on the solver to prove that this is the case.
Therefore, extend is guaranteed to produce a new class that is correct with respect to
interface vec-ext/c, justifying the elimination of expensive run-time checks. In a Racket
program computing the length of 100000 random vectors, eliminating these contracts re-
sults in a 100-fold speed-up.While such dramatic results are unlikely in full programs, mea-
surements of existing Racket programs suggests that 50% speedups are possible (Strickland
et al. 2012).
3 A Symbolic Language with Contracts
In this section, we give a reduction system describing the core of our approach. Symbolic
λC is a model of a pure functional language with first-class contracts and symbolic values.
We first present the semantics, including handling of primitives and unknown functions,
that facilitates finding bugs and constructing test cases reproducing each reachable contract
violation. We then describe how the handling of primitive values integrates with external
solvers. Finally, we show an abstraction of our system to accelerate convergence, turning the
bug-finding semantics into a practical verification. For each abstraction, we relate concrete
and symbolic programs and prove a soundness theorem.
At a high level, the key idea of our semantics is that abstract values behave non-determin-
istically in all possible ways that concrete values might behave. Furthmore, abstract values
can be bounded by specifications in the form of contracts that limit these behaviors. As a
result, an operational semantics for abstract values explores all the ways that the concrete
program under consideration might be used.
Given this operational semantics, we can then examine the results of evaluation to see
if any results are errors blaming the components we wish to verify. If they do not, then
our soundness theorem implies that there are no ways for the component to be blamed,
regardless of what other parts of the program do. Thus, we have verified the component
against its contract in all contexts. We make this notion precise in section 3.6.
3.1 Syntax of Symbolic λC
Our initial language models the functional core of many modern dynamic languages, ex-
tended with behavioral, first-class contracts, as well as symbolic values. The abstract syntax
is shown in figure 1. Syntax needed only for symbolic execution is highlighted in gray; we
discuss it after the syntax of concrete programs.
A program P is a sequence of module definitions followed by a top-level expression
which may reference the modules. Each module M has a name H and exports a single
valueV with behavior enforced by contractVc. (Generalization to multiple-export modules
is straightforward.)
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Programs P,Q ::= −→M E
Modules M ::= (moduleHVcV)
Expressions E,C ::= A | XH | E EH | O −→E H | if E E E |C→λX .C
| monH,HH (C,E) | assume(V,V)
Answers A ::= V | blameHH
Values V ::= U | L
Concrete Values U ::= n | λX .E | V →λX .C
Operations O ::= O? | add1 | + | = | . . .
Predicates O? ::= zero? | int? | proc? | dep?
Variables X ,H ∈ identifier
Addresses L ∈ address
Fig. 1. Syntax of Symbolic λC
Expressions include standard forms such as values, variable and module references,
applications, and conditionals, as well as those for constructing and monitoring contracts.
Contracts are first-class values and can be produced by arbitrary expressions. For clarity,
when an expression plays the role of a contract, we use the metavariable C, rather than E.
A dependent function contract (C→λX .C′) monitors a function’s argument with C and its
result with the contract produced by applying λX .C′ to the argument.
A contract violation at run-time causes blame, an error with information about who
violated the contract. We write blameHH ′′ to mean module H is blamed for violating the
contract from H ′′. The form (monH,H
′
H ′′ (C,E)) monitors expression E with contract C, with
H being the positive party, H ′ the negative party, and H ′′ the source of the contract. The
system blames the positive party if E produces a value violatingC, and the negative one if
E is misused by the context of the contract check. To make context information available
at run-time, we annotate references and applications with labels indicating the module they
appear in, or † for the top-level expression. For example, HH ′ denotes a reference to the
name H from module H ′, and (add1 X)† denotes an addition inside the top level. When a
module H causes a primitive error, such as applying 5, we also write blameHΛ , indicating
that it violates a contract with the language. Monitoring forms, blaming forms, and labels
are not available for programmers to write. We omit labels when they are irrelevant or can
be inferred.
Concrete values U include abstractions, integers, and dependent contracts with domain
components evaluated. We use 0 to indicate falsehood and any other value for truth. Prim-
itive operations over values are standard, including predicates O? for dynamic testing of
data types.
To reason about absent components, we equip λC with unknown, or symbolic values,
which abstract over multiple concrete values exhibiting a range of behavior. Each ad-
dress L identifies an arbitrary but fixed and syntactically closed2 value in the program. For
soundness, execution must account for all possible concretizations of unknown values, and
reduction becomes non-deterministic. As execution progresses through tests and contract
2 For example, L cannot be instantiated by term (λx.y)
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checks, more assumptions can be made about symbolic values in each non-deterministic
branch. To track refinements of symbolic values, we use a heap that maps each address to
a refinable value, which includes concrete as well as abstract values of the form •−→U and
case[
−−−−→
V 7→ L]. We omit displaying this predicate set when it is empty, irrelevant, or can be
inferred from context. The form •−→U denotes a value known to satisfy contract set −→U but
is otherwise unknown. The form case[−−−−→V 7→ L] is used internally and denotes a mapping
between values, which we discuss further in section 3.2.3.
Refined Values U ′ ::= U | •−→U | case[−−−−→V 7→ L]
Heaps Σ ::=
−−−−→⟨L,U ′⟩.
3.2 Semantics of Symbolic λC
We now turn to the reduction semantics for Symbolic λC, which combines standard rules
for untyped languages with behavior for unknown values. Reduction is defined as a relation
on states, parameterized by a module context. We omit the module context whenever it is
irrelevant.
−→
M ⊢ ς 7−→ ς ′
A state is an expression paired with a heap:
States ς ::= ⟨E, Σ⟩.
3.2.1 Basic rules
The first reduction rule concerns the application of primitive operations, which are inter-
preted by a δ relation. The relation maps operations, arguments and heaps to results and
new heaps.
Apply-Primitive
δ (Σ,O,−→V ) ∋ ς
(O
−→
V ),Σ 7−→ ς
The use of a δ relation in reduction semantics is standard, but typically it is a function and
is independent of the heap. We make δ dependent on the heap in order to use and update the
current set of invariants; we make it a relation, since it may behave non-deterministically on
unknown values. For example, in interpreting (> L 5) where L 7→ •int?, the δ relation
will produce two results: 1, with an updated heap to reflect the unknown value is (>/c
5); the other 0, with a heap reflecting the opposite. The δ relation is thus the hub of the
verification system and a point of interaction with the SMT solver. It is described in more
detail in section 3.3.
Applications of λ -abstractions follow standard β -reduction; applications of non-func-
tions result in blame.
Apply-Function
(λX .E V),Σ 7−→ [V/X ]E,Σ
Apply-Non-Function
δ (Σ,proc?,V ) ∋ ⟨0, Σ′⟩
(V V ′)H ,Σ 7−→ blameHΛ ,Σ′
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Notice that in ruleApply-Non-Function, the δ relation is employed to determinewhether the
value in operator position is a function using the proc? primitive. (Non-functions include
concrete numbers as well as abstract values known to exclude functions; application of
abstract values that may be functions is described in section 3.2.3.)
Conditionals treat values other than 0 as true.
If-True
δ (Σ,zero?,V ) ∋ ⟨0, Σ′⟩
ifV E1 E2,Σ 7−→ E1,Σ′
If-False
δ (Σ,zero?,V ) ∋ ⟨1, Σ′⟩
ifV E1 E2,Σ 7−→ E2,Σ′
Just as in the case of Apply-Non-Function, the interpretation of conditionals uses the δ
relation to determine whether zero? holds, which takes into account all of the knowledge
accumulated in Σ and in either branch that is taken, updates the current knowledge to reflect
whether zero? ofV holds. This is the mechanism by which control-flow based refinements
are enabled.
The two rules for module references reflect the approach in which contracts are treated
as boundaries between components (Dimoulas et al. 2011): a module self-reference incurs
no contract check, while cross-module references are protected by the specified contract.
Module-Self-Reference
(moduleHVcV) ∈ −→M
−→
M ⊢ HH,Σ 7−→V,Σ
Module-External-Reference
(moduleHVcV) ∈ −→M H ̸= H ′
−→
M ⊢ HH ′,Σ 7−→ monH,H ′H (Vc,V),Σ
Finally, any state that is stuck with blame inside an evaluation context transitions to a
final blame state that discards the surrounding context.
Halt-Blame
E ̸= [ ]
E [blame],Σ 7−→ blame,Σ
Evaluation contexts are defined as follows:
E ::= [ ] | E E | V E | O −→V E−→E | if E E E | mon(E ,E) | mon(V,E ) | E →λX .E
3.2.2 Contract monitoring
Contract monitoring follows existing operational semantics for contracts (Findler and Fell-
eisen 2002), with extensions to handle and refine symbolic values.
There are several cases for checking a value against a contract. If the contract is not a
function contract, we say it is flat, denoting a first-order property to be checked immedi-
ately. We thus expand the checking expression to a conditional.
Monitor-Flat-Contract
δ (Σ,dep?,Vc) ∋ ⟨0, Σ′⟩ Σ′ ⊢V :Vc ?
monH,H
′
H ′′ (Vc,V),Σ 7−→ if (Vc V)assume(V,Vc)blameHH ′′ ,Σ′
Since contracts are first-class, they can also be abstract values; we rely on δ to determine
whether a value is a flat contract by using (the negation of) the predicate for dependent
contracts, dep?, instead of examining the syntax. This rule is standard except for the use of
assume(V,Vc) and the (· ⊢ · : ·?) judgment. The assume(V,Vc) form, whichwould normally
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just be V , dynamically refines address V in the heap to indicate that V satisfies Vc; assume
is discussed further in section 3.2.3. The judgment Σ′ ⊢ L :V ?, which would normally just
be omitted, indicates that the contract V cannot be statically judged to either pass or fail
for L, which is why the predicate must be applied. This judgment and its closely related
counterparts (· ⊢ · : ·3) and (· ⊢ · : ·7), which statically proves a value must or must not
satisfy a given contract respectively, are discussed in section 3.4.
If a flat contract can be statically proved or refuted, monitoring can be short-circuited.
Monitor-Proved
δ (Σ,dep?,Vc) ∋ ⟨0, Σ′⟩ Σ′ ⊢V :Vc3
mon(Vc,V),Σ 7−→V,Σ′
Monitor-Refuted
δ (Σ,dep?,Vc) ∋ ⟨0, Σ′⟩ Σ′ ⊢V :Vc 7
mon(Vc,V),Σ 7−→ blame,Σ′
Monitoring a function contract against a function is interpreted the standard η-expansion
of contracts, where we swap the blame roles of positive and negative parties (Findler and
Felleisen 2002). Similar to other values, function contracts can be either concrete or sym-
bolic. As we later shown in the definitions of δ and helper metafunction re f ine, when a
symbolic value is assumed a dependent contract, we decompose it into 2 other symbolic
values identifying its domain and range.
Monitor-Function-Contract
δ (Σ,proc?,V ) ∋ ⟨1, Σ′⟩
monH,H
′
H ′′ (Vc →λX .C,V),Σ 7−→ λX .monH,H
′
H ′′ (C,(V mon
H ′,H
H ′′ (Vc,X))),Σ
′
Monitor-Abstract-Function-Contract
δ (Σ,proc?,V ) ∋ ⟨1, Σ′⟩ δ (Σ′,dep?,L) ∋ ⟨1, Σ′′⟩ Σ′′(L) =Vc →λX .C
mon(L,V),Σ 7−→ λX .monH,H ′H ′′ (C,(V monH
′,H
H ′′ (Vc,X))),Σ
′′
Finally, monitoring a function contract against a non-function results in an error blaming
the party providing the value.
Monitor-Non-Function
δ (Σ,dep?,Vc) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,proc?,V ) ∋ ⟨0, Σ2⟩
monH,H
′
H ′′ (Vc,V),Σ 7−→ blameHH ′′ ,Σ2
3.2.3 Handling unknown values
The assume form updates the heap of refinements to take into account the new information
using the refine metafunction; see figure 2 for the definition of refine.
Assume
assume(V,Vc),Σ 7−→V,refine(Σ,V,Vc)
Refinement is straightforward propagation of known contracts, expanding values known to
be function contracts (via dep?) into function contract values.
Finally, we must handle application of unknown values. Notice that in the presence of
higher-order arguments, the obvious solution of using a table to model each unknown
function does not work. First, a higher-order function interacts with its context not only
through its returned result, but also the values it supplies to its functional arguments. Using
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a table would omit the latter means through which the unknown function triggers errors in
its context. Second, there is no obvious choice of equality between higher-order values for
use as table keys. For example, it is not clear whether (λ (x) x) and (λ (y) y) should
be the same key. Third, there is no direct connection between a higher-order keyed table
and a λ-term: a naive construction does not yield the intended function. The following λ-
term indeed would only execute the else clause reguardless of its argument, because a
comparison to a function literal in most languages is guaranteed to return false.
(λ (f)
(cond [(equal? f (λ (x) x)) ...#|dead code|#...]
[(equal? f (λ (y) y)) ...#|dead code|#...]
[else ...]))
Therefore, instead of viewing a higher-order function as a mapping, we consider different
ways in which it interacts with the known components of the program. Even though there
are numerous ways to instantiate a λ-term, a function only interacts with its context in a
few specific ways. For example, it is not neccessary to consider unknown components that
perform unnecessary computations, have their own errors, or diverge: for each function
with such behavior, there exists another terminating, error-free function that explores no
fewer contract violations in concrete modules.
We therefore refine each unknown function to have a specific shape shown in rule Apply-
Unknown. The unknown function dynamically inspects its argument’s datatype to perform
an appropriate operation. If the argument is a first-order value, we model the function as a
table using the case[−−−−→V 7→ L] form discussed next. If the argument is a function, the unknown
function can interact with it in several ways: (1) apply the function to an unknown value
then pass the result to another unknown “continuation”, (2) delay the exploration of the
function’s behavior and return a value depending on this function, (3) ignore the function
and return a value independent of it.We use addresses L f ,Lg,Lx,La for new symbolic values
that this unknown function decomposes to, and symbolic values L1,L2 to encode the non-
deterministic (but remembered) choices.
Apply-Unknown
δ (Σ,proc?,L) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ Σ1(L) = •
Σ2 = Σ1[L1 7→ •,L2 7→ •,L f 7→ •,Lg 7→ •,Lx 7→ •,La 7→ •,L′ 7→ case[ ],L 7→ λX .E]
where E = if (proc? X) (if L1 ((L f (X Lx)) X) (if L2 λY.((Lg X) Y)La)) (L′ X)
L V,Σ 7−→ [V/X ]E,Σ2
Finally, finite maps of the form case[−−−−→V 7→ L] on first-order values are used internally
by the execution. Application rules are straightforward as shown in rules Apply-Case-1
and Apply-Case-2: if the application has been seen before, we reuse the result address,
otherwise we return a fresh address and remember the new result in the table.
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refine(Σ,L,dep?) = Σ[Lx 7→ •,Lc 7→ •,L 7→ (Lx →λX .(Lc X))]
where Σ(L) = • and Lx,L′c /∈ dom(Σ)
refine(Σ,L,Vi) = Σ[L 7→ •
−→
V ∪Vi ] where Σ(L) = •
−→
V
refine(Σ,L,V ) = Σ otherwise
Fig. 2. Refinement for Symbolic λC
Apply-Case-1
Σ(L) = case[. . . ,V ′ 7→ L′, . . .] δ (Σ,=,V V ′) ∋ ⟨1, Σ′⟩
L V,Σ 7−→ L′,Σ′
Apply-Case-2
Σ(L) = case[V ′ 7→ L′ . . .]
δ (Σ,=,Vn V ′i ) ∋ ⟨0, Σ′⟩ for all V ′i ∈ {V ′ . . .} Ln /∈ dom(Σ)
L Vn,Σ 7−→ L′,Σ[Lx 7→ •,L 7→ case[V ′ 7→ L′ . . . ,Vn 7→ Ln]]
3.3 Primitive operations
Primitive operations are the primary place where unknown values in the heap are refined,
in concert with successful contract checks. Figure 3 shows δ ’s definition.
The first four rules cover primitive predicate checks. Ambiguity never occurs for con-
crete values, and an abstract value may definitely prove or refute the predicate if the avail-
able information is enough for the conclusion. If the proof system cannot decide a definite
result for the predicate check, δ conservatively includes both answers in the possible re-
sults and records assumptions chosen for each non-deterministic branch in the appropriate
heap. Rules for partial functions such as addition and integer equality, which fail when
given non-numeric inputs, reveal possible refinements when applying. This mechanism,
when combined with the SMT-aided proof system given below, is sufficient to provide the
precision necessary to prove the absence of contract errors.
3.4 SMT-aided proof system
Contract checking and primitive operations rely on a proof system to statically relate val-
ues and contracts. We write Σ ⊢V :Vc3 to mean value V satisfies contract Vc, where all
addresses in V are defined in Σ. In other words, under any possible instantiation of the
unknown values in Σ, it would satisfy Vc when checked according to the semantics. On
the other hand, Σ ⊢ V : Vc 7 indicates that V definitely fails Vc. Finally, Σ ⊢ V : Vc ? is a
conservative answer when information from the heap and refinement set is insufficient to
draw a definite conclusion. The precision of our analysis depends on the precision of this
provability relation—increasing the number of contracts that can be related statically to
values prunes spurious paths and eliminates impossible error cases.
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Pred-True
Σ ⊢V : O?3
δ (Σ,O?,V ) ∋ ⟨1, Σ⟩
Pred-False
Σ ⊢V : O? 7
δ (Σ,O?,V ) ∋ ⟨0, Σ⟩
Pred-Ambig-True
Σ ⊢V : O? ?
δ (Σ,O?,V ) ∋ ⟨1, refine(Σ,V,O?)⟩
Pred-Ambig-False
Σ ⊢V : O? ?
δ (Σ,O?,V ) ∋ ⟨0, refine(Σ,V,O?)⟩
Plus-Concrete
δ (Σ,+,n1,n2) ∋ ⟨n1+n2, Σ⟩
Plus-Error-1
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨0, Σ1⟩
δ (Σ,+,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨blameΛ, Σ1⟩
Plus-Error-2
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,int?,V2) ∋ ⟨0, Σ2⟩
δ (Σ,+,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨blameΛ, Σ2⟩
Plus-Abstract
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,int?,V2) ∋ ⟨1, Σ2⟩ V1 ̸= n or V2 ̸= n
δ (Σ,+,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨•{int?,(=/c (+ V1 V2))}, Σ2⟩
Eq-Error-1
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨0, Σ1⟩
δ (Σ,=,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨blameΛ, Σ1⟩
Eq-Error-2
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,int?,V2) ∋ ⟨0, Σ2⟩
δ (Σ,=,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨blameΛ, Σ2⟩
Eq-True
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,int?,V2) ∋ ⟨1, Σ2⟩ Σ2 ⊢V1 : (=/c V2)3
δ (Σ,=,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨0, Σ2⟩
Eq-False
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,int?,V2) ∋ ⟨1, Σ2⟩ Σ2 ⊢V1 : (=/c V2)7
δ (Σ,=,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨0, Σ2⟩
Eq-Ambig-True
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,int?,V2) ∋ ⟨1, Σ2⟩ Σ2 ⊢V1 : (=/c V2)?
δ (Σ,=,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨0, refine(Σ2,V1,(=/c V2))⟩
Eq-Ambig-False
δ (Σ,int?,V1) ∋ ⟨1, Σ1⟩ δ (Σ1,int?,V2) ∋ ⟨1, Σ2⟩ Σ2 ⊢V1 : (=/c V2)?
δ (Σ,=,V1,V2) ∋ ⟨0, refine(Σ2,V1,(≠/c V2))⟩
Fig. 3. Basic Operations
3.4.1 Basic proof system
A simple proof system (figure 4) can be obtained which returns definite answers for con-
crete values, uses heap refinements, and handles negation of predicates and disjointness of
data types. We abbreviate λX .(O? X) as O?.
Notice that the proof system only needs to handle a small number of well-understood
contracts. We rely on evaluation to naturally break down complex contracts into smaller
ones and take care of subtle issues such as divergence and crashing. By the time we have
Σ(L) = •−→V , we can assume all contracts in −→V have terminated with success on L. With
these simple and obvious rules, our system can already verify a significant number of
interesting programs. With SMT solver integration, as described below, we can handle far
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Σ ⊢ Σ(L) :Vc3
Σ ⊢ L :Vc3
Σ ⊢ Σ(L) :Vc 7
Σ ⊢ L :Vc 7 Σ ⊢ n : int?3 Σ ⊢ λX .E : proc?3
Σ ⊢V →λX .C : dep?3
Σ ⊢V : int?3 Σ ⊢V : (=/c 0)3
Σ ⊢V : zero?3
Σ ⊢V : int?3 Σ ⊢V : (=/c 0)7
Σ ⊢V : zero?7
Σ ⊢V : int?7
Σ ⊢V : zero?7
Σ ⊢V : O′?3 O′? ̸= O? O?,O′? ∈ {int?,proc?,dep?}
Σ ⊢V : O? 7 Σ ⊢ •{...Vc...} :Vc3
Σ ⊢V : λX .E 3
Σ ⊢V : λX .(zero? E)7
Σ ⊢V : λX .E 7
Σ ⊢V : λX .(zero? E)3
Σ(V ) = {. . .λX .(zero? E) . . .}
Σ ⊢V : λX .E 7
Σ ⊢V :Vc3 is not derivable Σ ⊢V :Vc 7 is not derivable
Σ ⊢V :Vc ?
Fig. 4. Basic Proof System
more interesting constraints, including relations between numeric values, without requiring
an encoding of the full language.
3.4.2 Integrating an SMT solver
We extend the simple provability relation by employing an external solver.
We first define the translation {{·}} from heaps, address-value pairs, and address-contract
pairs into formulas in solver S:
{{−−−→(L,V )}} = (∧ −−−−−−→{{L 7→V}})
{{L 7→ n}} = L = n
{{L 7→ •−→C }} = ∧−−−−−→{{L:C}}
{{L0 : (>/c V1)}} = L0 > V1
{{L : (=/c (+ V0 V1))}} = L = V0 + V1
The translation of a heap is the conjunction of all formulas generated from translatable re-
finements. The function is partial, and there are straightforward rules for translating specific
pairs of (L :C) whereC are drawn from a small set of simple, well-understood contracts.
This mechanism is enough for the system to verify many interesting programs because
the analysis relies on evaluation to break down complex, higher-order predicates. Not hav-
ing a translation for some contractC only reduces precision and does not affect soundness.
Next, the extension (⊢S) is straightforward. The old relation (⊢) is refined by a solver
S. Whenever the basic relation proves Σ ⊢ L :C?, we call out to the solver to try to either
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prove or refute the claim:
{{Σ}}∧¬{{V :Vc}} is unsat
Σ ⊢S V :Vc3
{{Σ}}∧{{V :Vc}} is unsat
Σ ⊢S V :Vc 7
The solver-aided relation uses refinements available on the heap to generate premises {{Σ}}.
Unsatisfiability of {{Σ}}∧¬{{V :C}} is equivalent to validity of {{Σ}} ⇒ {{V :C}}, hence
value definitely satisfies contractC. Likewise, unsatisfiability of {{Σ}}∧{{V :C}}meansV
definitely refutesC. In any other case, we relate the value-contract pair to the conservative
answer.
3.5 Program evaluation
We give a reachable-states semantics to programs: the initial program P is paired with
an initial heap that maps each address in the program to a fully opaque value, and eval
produces all states in the reflexive, transitive closure of the single-step reduction relation
closed under evaluation contexts.
eval : P→P(ς)
eval(
−→
ME) = {ς | −→M ⊢ (E ′;E),Σ0 7−→⋆ ς}
where E ′ = amb({1,−−−−→(Lh H)}), (moduleHVcV) ∈ −→M
and Σ0 = {L 7→ • | L appears in P}∪{Lh 7→ •}
and amb{E}= E; amb{Ei,E . . .}= if Li Ei (amb{E . . .}), for each fresh address Li
Modules with unknown definitions, which we call opaque, complicate the definition of
eval, since they may contain references to concrete modules. If only the main module
is considered, an opaque module might misuse a concrete value in ways not visible to the
system.We therefore apply an unknown function to each concrete module before evaluating
the main expression.
3.6 Soundness of abstract semantics
A program with unknown components is an abstraction of a fully-known program. Thus,
the semantics of the abstracted program should approximate the semantics of any such
concrete version. In particular, any behavior the concrete program exhibits should also be
exhibited by the abstract approximation of that program.
However, we must be precise as to which behaviors are relevant. Suppose we have a
single concrete module that links against a single opaque module. The semantics of this
program should include all of the possible behaviors, both good and bad, of the known
module assuming the opaque module always lives up to its contract. We exclude from
consideration behaviors that cause the unknown module to be blamed, since it is of course
impossible to verify an unknown program. In other words, we try to verify the parts of
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the program that are known, assuming arbitrary, but correct, behavior for the parts of the
program that are unknown.3
For this reason, the precise semantic account of blame is crucial. The demonic context
can introduce blame of both the known and unknown modules; since we can distinguish
these parties, it is easy to ignore blame of the unknown context.
In the remainder of this section, we formally define the approximation relation and show
that evaluation preserves this relation, i.e. if program q is an approximation of program
p (p is like q but with no unknown), then the evaluation of q is an approximation of the
evaluation of p.
3.6.1 Approximation
Wewrite ς ′ ⊑ ς to mean “ς approximates ς ′,” or “ς ′ instantiates ς ,” which intuitively means
ς stands for a set of states including ς ′. For example, ⟨1, /0⟩ ⊑ ⟨L, {L 7→ •}⟩. Because
we restrict the instantiating side to contain no symbolic value, the heap is irrelevant, we
abbreviate ⟨E ′, /0⟩ ⊑ ⟨E, Σ⟩ as E ′ ⊑ ⟨E, Σ⟩ and ⟨E ′1, /0⟩ 7−→ ⟨E ′2, /0⟩ as E ′1 7−→ E ′2.
Consistent instantiation of symbolic values In order to enforce that each symbolic value
is instantiated by one concrete value, we parameterize the relation with a fully concrete
heap indicating the instantiation of each symbolic value. For example, expression (+ 1 2)
instantiates ⟨(+L1L2), {L1 7→ •,L2 7→ •}⟩, parameterized by {L1 7→ 1,L2 7→ 2}. A naive
definition of the approximation without this parameter would admit a weaker approxi-
mation relation not preserved by reduction, where different sub-expressions instantiate
symbolic values differently. For example, in the following, suppose we admitted that E ′ ⊑
⟨E, Σ⟩ by straightforward structural induction without enforcing consistent instantiation of
labels (because 0, 1, 2 each refines ⟨L, {L 7→ •}⟩ individually), we would need to prove
that their next states preserve the relation.
E ′ = (if 0 1 2)
⟨E ′, Σ⟩ = ⟨(if L L L), {L 7→ •}⟩
The next abstract state, however, does not continue to approximate the concrete one:
E ′ 7−→ 2
⟨E, {L 7→ •}⟩ 7−→ ⟨L, {L 7→ 0}⟩
With a parameter enforcing consistent instantiation of symbolic values, we prevent this “ac-
cidental” approximation to establish. In the above example, since there is no instantiation
Σ′ such that Σ′(L) = 0 and Σ′(L) = 2, we cannot derive that E ′ ⊑Σ′ ⟨E, Σ⟩ in the first place.
Instead, in the following example, E ′ ⊑Σ′ (E,Σ), where Σ′ = {L0 7→ 0,L1 7→ 1,L2 7→ 2}:
E ′ = (if 0 1 2)
E = (if L0 L1 L2) Σ= {L0 7→ •,L1 7→ •,L2 7→ •}
3 Equivalently, we can think of the execution as implicitly blaming each unknown component for
each possible error with a trivially constructed counterexample.
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Omitting behavior from unknown components Our soundness result does not consider
additional errors that blame unknown modules, and therefore we parameterize the approx-
imation relation⊑Σ−→
M
with the module definitions−→M to select the opaque modules. We omit
these parameters where they are easily inferred to ease notation.
Figure 5 shows the definition of⊑Σ−→
M
. Each concrete value is approximated by a symbolic
value if the heap gives no restriction on the symbolic value’s behavior. Further, if the
concrete value is known to satisfy a contract, adding that contract to the abstract value
preserves the approximation. We write Σ(U) to mean a straightforward instantiation of
all symbolic values in U according to heap Σ. We extend the relation ⊑Σ−→
M
structurally to
evaluation contexts E , point-wise to sequences, and to sets of program states.
Instantiating unknown components Finally, we justify our choice of instantiating un-
known functions to only one specific shape, and show that it is sufficient to approximate
all possible interactions between the known and unknown program components.
Lemma 1 (Canonical counterexample)
IfV andV ′ come from different modules, (moduleHVcV ′)∈−→M , and (V V ′) 7−→⋆ Awhere
A is a value or blameH , there exists λX .E such that (λX .E V ′) 7−→⋆ A and λX .E conforms
to Vr in the following grammar:
Vr ::= λX .(if (proc? X) (if n((Vr (X V)) X)V )(Vm X))
Vm ::= λX .(if (= X n)V (Vm X)) | λX .V
Proof
Without loss of generality, assume V is non-recursive, bug-free, and does not introduce
divergence of its own. (If V is recursive, we unroll it as many time as needed to reproduce
the finite trace when applied to V ′. Further, V ’s own bug or potential divergence must not
have affected the result of its application toV ′, so we replace the corresponding source code
with trivial expressions.)
If the function body E can be decomposed into an evaluation context and a redex E [E ′],
without loss of generality, we only consider cases where E ′ contains X and depends on an
actual value of X to reduce. (Otherwise, because E ′ does not contain divergence or error of
its own, we can safely “partially evaluate” E ′ to eliminate any redundant redex.)
We therefore translate E for the following cases. Translation {{E}}−→V behaves identically
to E up to the finite value set −→V that the free variable X in E can have. The translation
terminates by decreasing on E’s size.
• Case E = E [if X E1 E2]:
{{E}} = (if (proc? X)E ′1 (Vm X)), where
— (if (proc? X)E ′1 E ′2) = {{E [E1]}}
— Vm is a table approximating E2 over
−→
V for X . (because E2 does not have errors
and divergence, and X is known to be numbers, the evaluation of E2 for these
particular values of X is guaranteed to terminate.)
• Case E = E [X V ]:
{{E}} = (if (proc? X)(((λZ.λX .{{E [Z]}}) (X V)) X)(λX .0 X))
• Case E = E [proc? X ]:
Case analysis on E
ZU064-05-FPR paper-jfp 20 March 2016 10:4
Higher-order symbolic execution for contract verification and refutation 25
— Case E = E ′[if [ ]E1 (Vm X)]:
{{E}} = if (proc? X)E ′1 E ′2
, where (if (proc? X)E ′1E ′′1 ) = {{E ′[E1]}} andVm is an approximation of E2 over−→
V for X .
— Case E = E ′[OV ′ . . . [ ]V ′ . . .]: Because (proc? X) only evaluates to either 0 or
1, there are 3 cases:
– (OV ′ . . . [ ] V ′ . . .) preserves the truth of (proc? X): then
{{E}}= {{E ′[proc? X ]}}
– (OV ′ . . . [ ] V ′ . . .) negates the truth of (proc? X): then
{{E}}= (if (proc? X)E ′1 E ′2)
where (if (proc? X)E ′1 E ′′) = {{E ′[0]}}
and (if (proc? X)E ′ E ′2) = {{E ′[1]}}
– (O V ′ . . . [ ] V ′ . . .) has constant truth reguardless of (proc? X): then {{E}}
= {{E ′[0]}} or {{E ′[1]}} depending on the constant truth.
— Case E = [ ]: {{E}} = (if (proc? X)1(λX .0 X))
• Case E = E [int? X ]: Similar to the previous case but with the clauses reversed.
• Case E = E [O V ′ . . . X V ′ . . .] , where V ′ ::= V | X :
Because E is bug-free and divergence-free by assumption, and X is first-order, {{E}}
= (if (proc? X) 0 (Vm X)) , where Vm is constructed as a table mapping each value
Vi in
−→
V to the evaluation of [Vi/X ]E (which terminates).
• Case E = X : {{E}} = if (proc? X)X X
• Case E =V : {{E}} = if (proc? X)V V
With the definition of approximation in hand, we now state the main soundness lemma
for the system, which is the basis for relative completeness of counterexamples (3.7) and
soundness of contract verification (3.8).
Lemma 2 (Soundness of reduction relation)
If E ′1 ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨E1, Σ1⟩ and E ′1 7−→ E ′2, then ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨E2, Σ2⟩ such that E ′2 ⊑Σ
′′
−→
M
⟨E2, Σ2⟩
and Σ′′ is consistent with Σ′, for some E2, Σ2, and Σ′′.
We defer all proofs to the appendix for space.
3.7 Soundness and relative completeness of counterexample generation
The semantics of λC accumulates a first-order path-invariant as standard in first-order sym-
bolic execution. In addition to this, it also refines the shape of unknown higher-order values.
When an evaluation reaches an error state, we query the SMT solver for a model to all first-
order values. Plugging this instantiation of first-order values into the heap directly gives
us an instantiation of all originally omitted values that reproduces the error. An unknown
higher-order value with no constraint on it can be any function, particularly the identify
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Unknown
Σ(L) = • Σ′(L) =U
U ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨L, Σ⟩
Unknown-Refined
U ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨L, Σ⟩ Σ(L) = •
−→
Uc /0 ⊢U : Σ′(U ′)3
U ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨L, Σ[L 7→ •
−→
Uc∪{U ′}]⟩
Lambda-Unknown
Σ(L) = λX .E E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨E, Σ⟩
λX .E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨L, Σ⟩
Blame-Ignored
(moduleHVc L) ∈ −→M or H ∈ {†,Λ}
blameHH ′ ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨E, Σ⟩
Num
n⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨n, Σ⟩
If
E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨E, Σ⟩ E ′1 ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨E1, Σ⟩ E ′2 ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨E2, Σ⟩
if E ′ E ′1 E
′
2 ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨if E E1 E2, Σ⟩
Lambda
E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨E, Σ⟩
λX .E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨λX .E, Σ⟩
App
E ′1 ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨E1, Σ⟩ E ′2 ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨E2, Σ⟩
(E ′1 E
′
2)⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨(E1 E2), Σ⟩
Prim
E ′i ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨Ei, Σ⟩, for each E ′i ∈
−→
E ′ , Ei ∈ −→E
(O
−→
E ′)⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨(O −→E ), Σ⟩
Check
C′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨C, Σ⟩ E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨E, Σ⟩
monH,H
′
H ′′ (C
′,E ′)⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨monH,H ′H ′′ (C,E), Σ⟩
Var
X ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨X , Σ⟩
Blame
blameHH ′′ ⊑Σ
′
−→
M
⟨blameHH ′′ , Σ⟩
Dep
C′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨C, Σ⟩ E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨E, Σ⟩
C′ →λX .E ′ ⊑Σ′−→
M
⟨C→λX .E, Σ⟩ Σ′ ⊑ /0
Σ′1 ⊑ Σ′2 V ′ ⊑Σ
′
1 ⟨V, Σ′2⟩
Σ′1[L 7→V ′]⊑ Σ′2[L 7→V ]
Fig. 5. Approximation
function that can be simplified away. The remarkable result is that our method of finding
counterexamples is both sound and relatively complete with respect to the underlying first-
order SMT solver.
Soundness of counterexamples Because we refine unknown functions to have specific
shapes in addition to maintaining a complete path condition of first-order values, the se-
mantics of λC is a sound under-approximation of all valid program runs. Therefore, any
valid instantiation of the path condition for a specific branch will reproduce the execution
following that branch. In particular, an instantiation in an error branch yields a true coun-
terexample triggering the contract violation of that branch.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of Counterexamples)
If ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨blameHH ′ , Σn⟩, Σ′ ⊑ Σn, and E ′1 = Σ′(E1) then E ′1 7−→⋆ blameHH ′ .
Relative completeness of counterexamples The abstract reduction semantics of λC also
provides a sound over-approximation of all possible interactions between the known and
unknown program components, discovering every reachable error in the concrete modules
(lemma 2). Therefore, as long as the SMT solver can construct a model to the given first-
order formula, we can construct a higher-order function that reproduces each discovered
error, simply by plugging in the first-order values given by the solver.
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Theorem 2 (Relative Completeness of Counterexamples)
If E ′1 7−→⋆ blameHH ′ , E ′1 ⊑ ⟨E1, Σ1⟩, and there is a complete procedure for generating values
satisfying first-order constraints, then ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨blameHH ′ , Σn⟩ such that we can derive
some Σ′ such that Σ′ ⊑ Σn.
3.8 From bug-finding to verification
The semantics of λC not only is helpful for generating test cases that reproduce contract
violations, it also helps verification of contract-correctness. Because the existence of a
counterexample implies the existence of a “canonical” counterexample of the form in rule
Apply-Unknown (lemma 1), proving the absence of counterexamples of this form alone is
equivalent to verification of the program. Unfortunately, a naive run of a program in this
semantics does not terminate for most programs: execution unfolds indefinitely to explore
an infinite set of instantiations to abstract values. We therefore introduce two transforma-
tions that approximate the semantics of λC to accelerate convergence, making it a practical
verification for many programs.
3.8.1 Approximating unknown functions
Rule Apply-Unknown shown in section 3.2.3 unfolds and remembers the shape of each
unknown function as execution progresses. Although this refinement is useful for construct-
ing higher-order counterexamples, it is a major source of non-termination: the execution
repeatedly generates fresh λ-terms. As a more approximate execution of opaque function
applications, we no longer unfold an unknown function upon application and replace rule
Apply-Unknown with two non-deterministic rules: Apply-Unknown-Success returns a fresh
address approximating an unknown result, andApply-Unknown-Havoc passes the argument
to a demonic context whose sole purpose is to find reachable blames in the argument: it
repeatedly applies the argument to an unknown value, then places the value back into the
unknown context. (Even thoughV may not be a function, the semantics of blames allows us
to ignore the potentially erroneous application, which is the responsibility of the unknown
component.)
Apply-Unknown-Success
Σ(L) = •
−→
U δ (Σ,proc?,L) ∋ ⟨1, Σ′⟩
L V,Σ 7−→ L′,Σ′[L′ 7→ •]
Apply-Unknown-Havoc
Σ(L) = •
−→
U δ (Σ,proc?,L) ∋ ⟨1, Σ′⟩
L V,Σ 7−→ L (V L′),Σ′[L′ 7→ •]
This abstraction does not allow easy construction of concrete counterexamples in case of
errors, and may introduce more spurious paths, but does not significantly affect precision
in practice. Below is an example where the abstracted semantics steps to a false contract
violation, even though the second error is not reachable. The unknown function f either
applies or ignores its argument, but the abstraction prevents execution from remembering
the choice in a particular branch.
(let ([f L]) ;; where {L 7→ •}
(f (λ (x) (/ 1 0)))
(f (λ (x) (/ 1 x))))
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Lemma 3 (Soundness of unknown function approximation)
If (V1 V2) ⊑ ⟨(L V), Σ⟩ and (V1 V2) 7−→ E ′ then ⟨(L V), Σ⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨E, Σ′⟩ such that E ′ ⊑
⟨E, Σ′⟩.
3.8.2 Summarizing function results
With the abstraction as presented in section 3.8.1, the semantics still does not terminate for
many common recursive programs. Consider the following example:
(define (fact n)
(if (= n 0) 1 (* n (fact (- n 1)))))
(fact Ln)
Ignoring error cases, it eventually reduces non-deterministically to all of the following:
1 if Ln 7→ 0
(* Ln 1) if Ln ̸7→ 0, Ln−1 7→ 0
(* Ln (* Ln−1 (fact Ln−1))) if Ln, Ln−1 ̸7→ 0
where Ln−1 is a fresh address resulting from subtracting Ln by one. The process continues
with Ln−2, Ln−3, etc. This behavior from the analysis happens because it attempts to ap-
proximate all possible concrete substitutions to abstract values. Although fact terminates
for all concrete naturals, there are an infinite number of those: Ln can be 0, 1, 2, and so on.
To enforce termination for all programs, we can resort to well-known techniques such
as finite state or pushdown abstractions (Van Horn and Might 2012). But often those are
overkill at the cost of precision. Consider the following program:
(let* ([id (λ (x) x)]
[y (id 0)]
[z (id 1)])
(< y z))
where a monovariant flow analysis such as 0CFA (Shivers 1988) thinks y and z can be both
0 and 1, and pushdown analysis thinks y is 0 and z is either 0 or 1. For a concrete, straight-
line program, such imprecision seems unsatisfactory. We therefore aim for an analysis that
provides exact execution for non-recursive programs and retains enough invariants to verify
interesting properties of recursive ones. The analysis quickly terminates for a majority of
programming patterns with decent precision, although it is not guaranteed to terminate in
the general case—see section 4 for empirical results.
One technical difficulty is that the semantics of contracts prevents us from using a recur-
sive function’s contract directly as a loop invariant, because contracts are only boundary-
level enforcement. It is unsound to assume returned values of internal calls can be approx-
imated by contracts, as in f below.
(f : (and/c int? (≥/c 0)) → (and/c int? (≥/c 0)))
(define (f n)
(if (= n 0) "" (string-length (f (- n 1)))))
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If we assume the expression (f (- n 1)) returns a number as specified in the contract,
we will conclude f never returns, and is blamed either for violating its own contract by
returning a string, or for applying string-length to a number. However, f returns 0 when
applied to 1. To soundly and precisely approximate this semantics in the absence of types,
we recover data type invariants by execution.
We modify the application rules as follows. At each application, we decide whether
execution should step to the function’s body or wait for known results from other branches.
When an application (f v) reduces to a similar application, we plug in known results
instead of executing f’s body again, avoiding the infinite loop. Correspondingly, when (f
v) returns, we plug the new-found answer into contexts that need the result of (f v). The
execution continues until it has a set soundly describing the results of (f v).
To track information about application results and waiting contexts, we augment the
execution with two global tables M and Ξ as shown in figure 8. We borrow the choice of
metavariable names from work on concrete summaries (Johnson and Van Horn 2014).
A value memo table M maps each application to known results and corresponding re-
finements. Intuitively, if M(Σ,Vf ,Vx) ∋ (V,Σ′) then in some execution branch, there is an
application (Vf Vx),Σ 7−→⋆ (V,Σ′).
A context memo table Ξ maps each application to contexts waiting for its result. Intu-
itively, Ξ(Σ,Vf ,Vx) ∋ ⟨F,Σ′,E1,Ek⟩ means during evaluation, some expression
E1[(rt⟨Σ,V f ,Vx⟩ [Ek[(Vf Vz)]])]
with heap Σ′ is paused because applying (Vf Vz) under assumptions in Σ′ is the same as
applying (Vf Vx) under assumptions in Σ up to consistent address renaming specified by
function F .
To keep track of function applications seen so far, we extend the language with the
expression (rt⟨Σ,V,V ′⟩ E), which marks E as being evaluated as the result of applying V
toV ′, but otherwise behaves like E. The expression (blur⟨F,Σ,V ⟩ E), whose detailed role is
discussed below, approximates E under guidance from a “previous” value V .
A state in the approximating semantics with summarization consists of global tables Ξ,
M, and a set S of explored states −→ς .
Reduction now relates tables Ξ, M, and a set of states −→ς to new tables Ξ′, M′ and a
new set of states−→ς ′. We define a relation ⟨Ξ,M,ς⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ,M,ς⟩, and then lift this relation
point-wise to sets of states. Figure 7 only shows rules that use the global tables or new
expression forms.
In the first rule, if an application ((λX .E)V) is not previously seen, execution proceeds
as usual, evaluating expression E with X bound to V , but marking this expression using rt.
Second, if a previous application of ((λX .E)V0) results in application of the same func-
tion to a new argument V , we approximate the new argument before continuing. Relation
≈F , straightforwardly defined in figure 9, determines whether two states are equivalent to
each other up to renaming F . Taking advantage of knowledge of the previous argument,
we guess the transition from the V0 to V and heuristically emulate an arbitrary amount of
such transformation using the ⊕ operator.
Third, when an application results in a similar one, we avoid stepping into the function
body and use known results from table M instead. In addition, we refine the current heap
to make better use of assumptions about the particular “base case”. We also remember the
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current context as one waiting for the result of such application. To speed up convergence,
apart from feeding a new answer Va to the context, we wrap the entire expression inside
(blur⟨F,Σ,V ⟩ [ ]) to approximate the future result.
The fourth rule in figure 7 shows reduction for returning from an application. Apart
from the current context, the value is also returned to any known context waiting on the
same application. Besides, the value is also remembered in table M. The resumption and
refinement are analogous to the previous rule.
Finally, expression (blur⟨F,Σ,V0⟩ V) approximates valueV under guidance from the pre-
vious value V0 and also approximates values on the heap from observation of the previous
case. Overall, the approximating operator⊕ occurs in three places: arguments of recursive
applications, result of recursive applications, and abstract values on the heapwhen recursive
applications return.
Figure 6 shows an implementation of operator ⊕ in an extended language with pairs.
The operator approximates the right operand with guidance from the left operand. We also
extend the syntax of values to represent inductively defined sets of values. For example,
µX .{empty,⟨•int?, !X⟩} denotes a proper list of integers.We approximate a concrete inte-
ger to an abstract one if a previous integer has been seen. (A more sophisticated implemen-
tation can use more fine-grained approximations such as positive and negative integers.)
Approximation of a pair distributes to each component if the left operand is also a pair. If
the left operand is an inductively defined set, the new value is “merged” into the set with
appropriate renaming or folding. If the left operand syntactically appears in the right one, we
emulate an arbitrary number of transitions from the former to the latter with an appropriate
inductive set. As a small precision optimization, we unroll the set once, emulating one
or more (instead of zero or more) transitions. Finally, we return the value itself as a safe
approximation. Notice that it is unsound to approximate an arbitrary value to •. In particular,
we cannot approximate a concrete function to •, discarding code with potential errors to
find.4 A good implementation of⊕ should allow convergence in common cases. Empirical
results for our tool are presented in section 4.
Soundness of summarization: A system ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩ approximates a concrete state E if we
can recover E from the system through approximation rules (figure 10). The first rule states
that if any state in S approximates E, the system approximates it. The second rule states
that if the system knows that an instantiation of (V Vx) results in a waiting context E ′k,
and E ′ is reachable from a (possibly different) instantiation of (V Vx), then the system
also approximates E ′k[E ′]. Context E ′0 is an irrelevant outermost context waiting for the
application’s result, and context frames (rt⟨·,·,·⟩ [ ]) mark the application history.
As a consequence, summarization properly handles repetition of waiting contexts, and
gives results that approximate any number of recursive applications.
With this definition in hand, we can state the central lemma to establish the soundness
of the revised semantics that uses summarization.
Lemma 4 (Soundness of summarization)
4 In an implementation using environment instead of substitution, we can distribute the
approximation to each closure’s environment’s range, obtaining approximations such as an
inductive set of closures representing an arbitrary number of wrappings around a function.
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Values V ::= . . . | empty | ⟨V, V ⟩ | µX .−→V | !X
n0 ⊕ n1 = •int? , if n0 ̸= n1
⟨V0,V1⟩ ⊕ ⟨V2,V3⟩= ⟨V0 ⊕ V2, V1 ⊕ V3⟩
µX .−→V0 ⊕ µY.−→V1 = µX .(−→V0⊕
−−−−−−→
[!X/!Y ]V1)
µX .−→V0 ⊕ V = µX .(−→V0⊕ [!X/µX .−→V0]V)
V0 ⊕ V1 = [(µX .{V0, [!X/V0]V1})/V0]V1 , if V0 ∈s V1
V0 ⊕ V1 = V1 , otherwise
where V ∈s V
V ∈s ⟨V0, V1⟩, if V ∈s V0 or V ∈s V1
Fig. 6. Approximation
E ̸= E1[(rt⟨Σ0,λX .E,V0⟩ Ek)] for any E1,Ek,Σ0,V0
⟨Ξ,M,E [((λX .E) V)],Σ⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ,M,E [(rt⟨Σ,λX .E,V ⟩ [V/X ]E)],Σ⟩
E = E1[(rt⟨Σ0,λX .E,V0⟩ Ek)] for some E1,Ek,Σ0,V0 ⟨Σ, V ⟩ ̸≈ ⟨Σ0, V0⟩ V1 =V0 ⊕ V
⟨Ξ,M,E [((λX .E) V)],Σ⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ,M,E [(rt⟨Σ,λX .E,V1⟩ [V1/X ]E)],Σ⟩
E = E1[(rt⟨Σ0,Vf ,V0⟩ Ek)] for some E1,Ek,Σ0,V0
⟨Σ, V ⟩ ≈F ⟨Σ0, V0⟩ Ξ′ = Ξ⊔ [⟨Σ0,V f ,V0⟩ 7→ ⟨F,Σ,E1,Ek⟩]
⟨Va, Σa⟩ ∈M[⟨Σ0,V f ,V0⟩] Σ′ = Σ
−−−−−−−−−→
[Ln 7→ Σa[Lo]] where
−−−−−→⟨Lo, Ln⟩= F
⟨Ξ,M,E [(V f V)],Σ⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ′,M,E1[(rt⟨Σ0,Vf ,V0⟩ (blur⟨F,Σa,Va⟩ Ek[Va]))],Σ′⟩
−−−−−→⟨Lo, Ln⟩= F Σ′ = Σ
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[Ln 7→ Σ0(L0) ⊕ Σ(L0)]
⟨Ξ,M,E [(blur⟨F,Σ0,V0⟩ V)],Σ⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ,M,E [V0 ⊕ V ],Σ′⟩
M′ =M⊔ [⟨Σ0,V f ,V0⟩ 7→ ⟨V, Σ⟩]
⟨Ξ,M,E [(rt⟨Σ0,Vf ,V0⟩ V)],Σ⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ,M′,E [V ],Σ⟩
M′ =M⊔ [⟨Σ0,V f ,V0⟩ 7→ ⟨V, Σ⟩]
⟨F,Σk,E1,Ek⟩ ∈ Ξ[⟨Σ0,V f ,V0⟩] Σ′k = Σk
−−−−−−−−→
[Ln 7→ Σ(Lo)] where
−−−−−→⟨Lo, Ln⟩= F
⟨Ξ,M,E [(rt⟨Σ0,Vf ,V0⟩ V)],Σ⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ,M′,E1[(rt⟨Σ0,Vf ,V0⟩ (blur⟨F,Σ,V ⟩ Ek[V ]))],Σ′k⟩
Fig. 7. Summarizing Semantics
If E ′1 ⊑ ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ and E ′1 7−→ E ′2, then ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩ such that E ′2 ⊑
⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩.
The proof is given in the appendix. With this lemma in place, it is straightforward to
define verification as a simple corollary of soundness and prove a blame theorem.
First we defined when a module is verified by our approach.
Definition 1 (Verified module)
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Expressions E += (rt⟨Σ,V,V ⟩ E) | (blur⟨F,Σ,V ⟩ E)
Evaluation contexts E += (rt⟨Σ,V,V ⟩ E ) | (blur⟨F,Σ,V ⟩ E )
Context memo tables Ξ ::=
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
((Σ,V,V ),
−−−−−−−→
(F,Σ,E ,E ))
Value memo tables M ::=
−−−−−−−−−−−→
((Σ,V,V ),
−−−→
(V,Σ))
Renamings F ::=
−−−→⟨L,L⟩
Fig. 8. Syntax extensions for approximation
⟨n, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨n, Σ⟩
⟨E ′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨E, Σ⟩
⟨λX .E ′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨λX .E, Σ⟩
⟨L′, L⟩ ∈ F Σ′(L′) = Σ(L)
⟨L′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨L, Σ⟩
⟨E ′f , Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨E f , Σ⟩ ⟨E ′x, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨Ex, Σ⟩
⟨(E ′f E ′x), Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨(E f Ex), Σ⟩
⟨E ′i , Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨Ei, Σ⟩ for each i
⟨(O −→E ′), Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨(O −→E ), Σ⟩
⟨E ′0, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨E0, Σ⟩ ⟨E ′1, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨E1, Σ⟩ ⟨E ′2, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨E2, Σ⟩
⟨if E ′0 E ′1 E ′2, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨if E0 E1 E2, Σ⟩
⟨C′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨C, Σ⟩ ⟨E ′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨E, Σ⟩
⟨C′ →λX .E ′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨C→λX .E, Σ⟩
⟨C′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨C, Σ⟩ ⟨E ′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨E, Σ⟩
⟨monH,H ′H ′′ (C′,E ′), Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨monH,H
′
H ′′ (C,E), Σ⟩
⟨V ′, Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨V, Σ⟩ ⟨V ′c , Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨Vc, Σ⟩
⟨assume(V ′,V ′c), Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨assume(V,Vc), Σ⟩ ⟨blameHH ′′ , Σ′⟩ ≈F ⟨blameHH ′ , Σ⟩
Fig. 9. State equivalence up to renaming
A module (moduleHVcV) ∈ P is verified in P if V ̸= L and eval(P) ̸∋ blameH.
Now, by soundness, H is always safe.
Theorem 3 (Verified modules can’t be blamed)
If a module named H is verified in P, then for any concrete program Q for which P is an
abstraction, eval(Q) ̸∋ blameH.
E ′ ⊑ ⟨E, Σ⟩ ⟨E, Σ⟩ ∈ S
E ′ ⊑ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩
Ξ(Σ0,V,Vx) = ⟨F,Σ1,E0,Ek⟩
E ′0 ⊑ ⟨E0, Σ1⟩ E ′k ⊑ ⟨Ek, Σ1⟩ V ′ ⊑ ⟨V, Σ1⟩ V ′0 ⊑ ⟨Vx, Σ1⟩ V ′1 ⊑ ⟨Vx, Σ1⟩
E ′0 ̸= E ′1[(rt⟨_,V ′,_⟩ E ′2)] for any E ′1, E ′2 E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′1⟩ E
′)]⊑ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩
E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′0⟩ E
′
k[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′1⟩ E
′)])]⊑ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩
Fig. 10. Approximation of Summarizing Semantics
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4 Implementation and evaluation
To validate our approach, we implemented a static contract checking tool, SCV, based on
the semantics presented in section 3. The system refutes incorrect programs with concrete
test cases by running the semantics in section 3.2 and verifies the absence of run-time errors
in correct programs using the abstracted semantics in section 3.8.2. In addition, there are
a number of implementation extensions for increased precision and performance. We then
applied SCV to a wide selection of programs drawn from the literature on verification of
higher-order programs, and report on the results.
The source code for SCV and all benchmarks are available along with instructions on
reproducing the results we report.5 Apart from being implemented as a command line tool,
our prototype is also available as a public web REPL.6
4.1 Implementation extensions
SCV supports an extended language beyond that presented in section 3 in order to handle
realistic programs. First, more base values and primitive operations are supported, such as
strings and symbols (and their operations), although we do not yet use a solver to reason
about values other than integers. We support Racket’s numeric tower, which introduces
more error sources and interesting counterexamples. Second, data structure definitions are
allowed at the top-level. Each new data definition induces a corresponding (automatic)
extension to the refinement of unknown functions to deal with the new class of data. The
unknown function now also non-deterministically decomposes its argument if the argu-
ment is a user-defined struct, in addition to applying functions and mapping first-order
values as in rule Apply-Unknown. We also extend the widening operator ⊕ to heuristically
approximate values of user-defined structs to inductively defined data, which gives good
precision in common programs. Third, modules have multiple named exports, to handle the
examples presented in section 2, and can include local, non-exported, definitions. Fourth,
functions can accept multiple arguments and can be defined to have variable-arity, as with
+, which accepts arbitrarily many arguments. This introduces new possibilities of errors
from arity mismatches. Fifth, a much more expressive contract language is implemented
with and/c, or/c, struct/c, µ/c for conjunctive, disjunctive, data type, and recursive
contracts, respectively. Sixth, we provide solver back-ends for both CVC4 (Barrett et al.
2011) and Z3 (Moura and Bjørner 2008).
4.2 Evaluating on existing benchmarks
To evaluate the applicability of SCV to a wide variety of challenging higher-order contract
checking problems, we collect examples from the following sources: programs that make
use of control-flow-based typing from work on occurrence typing (Tobin-Hochstadt and
Felleisen 2010), programs from work on soft typing, which uses flow analysis to check
the preconditions of operations (Cartwright and Fagan 1991), programs with sophisticated
5 github.com/philnguyen/soft-contract
6 scv.umiacs.umd.edu
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Corpus Lines Checks Correct Variant (ms) Incorrect Variant (ms)
Occurrence Typing 116 141 98.7 502.8
Soft Typing 134 177 12,747.0 331.0
Higher-order Recursion Schemes 527 859 14,190.7 (8) 8,172.3
Dependent Refinement Types 69 116 576.7 2,270.7
Higher-order Symbolic Execution 223 308 9,532.0 (1) 633.8
Correct anonymous programs (22) 158 213 268.6 -
Incorrect anonymous programs (110) 778 1,336 - 14,126.9 (5)
Student Video Games
Snake 164 246 38,602.3 3,034.2
Tetris 267 338 12,303.5 2,255.0
Zombie 249 476 21,276.2 1,152.0
Table 1. Summary benchmark results. (See the appendix for detailed results.)
specifications from work on model checking higher-order recursion schemes (Kobayashi
et al. 2011), programs from work on inference of dependent refinement types (Terauchi
2010), and programs with rich contracts from our prior work on higher-order symbolic
execution (Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012). We also evaluate SCV on three inter-
active student video games built for a first-year programming course: Snake, Tetris, and
Zombie. These programs were all originally written as sample solutions, following the
style expected of students in the course. Of these, Zombie is the most interesting: it was
originally an object-oriented program, translated using the encoding seen in section 2.6.
Finally, we collect programs submitted anonymously by the users of our web service.
In order to evaluate our counterexample generation, we modify many correct programs
to introduce errors. To do so, we weakened preconditions, (wrongly) strengthened pos-
conditions, or omitted checks before performing partial operations. For example, a resulting
program may deconstruct a potentially empty list, compare potentially non-real numbers,
or promise strict inequality where equality may happen in an edge case. We believe these
changes are representative of common mistakes.
We present our results in summary form in table 1, grouping each of the above sets
of benchmark programs; expanded forms of the tables are provided in the appendix. The
table shows total line count (excluding blank lines and comments) and the number of
static occurrences of contracts and primitives requiring dynamic checks such as function
applications and primitive operations. These checks can be eliminated if we can show that
they never fail; this has proven to produce significant speedups in practice, even without
eliminating more expensive contract checks (Tobin-Hochstadt et al. 2011).
The tables report the time verifying correct programs and refuting their incorrect variants.
Execution times are in milliseconds and measured on a Core i7 2.7GHz laptop with 8GB
of RAM. When the tool fails to fully verify a program in the “Correct Variant” column, we
report the number of false positives next to verification time. Similarly, when the tool fails
to generate a concrete counterexample for a program in the “Incorrect Variant” column, we
display the number of warnings (without concrete inputs) next to refutation time.
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4.3 Discussion
First, SCVworks on benchmarks for a range of previous static analyzers, from type systems
to model checking to program analysis.
Second, most programs are analyzed in a reasonable amount of time; the longest re-
maining analysis time is under 60 seconds. This demonstrates that although the termination
acceleration method of section 3.8.2 is not fully general, it is effective for many program-
ming patterns. For example, SCV terminates with good precision on last fromWright and
Cartwright (1997), which hides recursion behind the Y combinator.
Third, across all benchmarks, over 99% (4201/4210) of the contract checks are stati-
cally verified, enabling the elimination both of small checks for primitive operations and
expensive contracts; see below for timing results. This result emphasizes the value of static
contract checking: gaining confidence about correctness from expensive contracts without
actually incurring their cost. In practice, problems such as false positives and failure to
construct a concrete counterexample do not render the tool useless for the corresponding
programs. False positives reduce confidence about the program’s correctness and disable
contract optimization, but programmers can still run the programs with safety guaranteed
by the familiar contract monitoring semantics. On the other hand, even though SCV can-
not construct a counterexample for some programs in practice, it always soundly reports
potential contract violation. We discuss current difficulties in section 4.5.
Fourth, there are specific examples where our prototype proves to be a good complement
to random testing in discovering contract violations. For example, SCV finds a counterex-
ample to the following program quickly and automatically:
(define (f n) (/ 1 (- 100 n)))
Be default, QuickCheck does not find this error as it only considers integers from -99
to 99. Because QuickCheck treats a program as a black box, this conservative choice is
reasonable for fear that the integer may be a loop variable causing the test case to run for a
long time (Hughes 2015). In contrast, SCV explores the program’s semantics symbolically
and discovers 100 as a good test case.
Fifth, the resulting higher-order counterexamples suggest that SCV can produce useful
feedback. For example, it is easy for programmers to forget that Racket supports the full
numeric tower (St-Amour et al. 2012) and that the predicate number? accepts complex
numbers. In the following program, argmin’s contract is in fact too weak to protect the
function. SCV proves argmin unsafe by applying it to a specific combination of arguments.
First, f is given a function that produces a non-real number. Second, xs is given a list of
length 2, which is the minimum length to trigger a use of <.
(f : (any/c → number?) (and/c pair? list?) → any/c)
(define (argmin f xs)
(argmin/acc f (car xs) (f (car xs)) (cdr xs)))
(define (argmin/acc f b a xs)
(cond
[(null? xs) a]
[(< b (f (car xs))) (argmin/acc f a b (cdr xs))]
ZU064-05-FPR paper-jfp 20 March 2016 10:4
36
[else (argmin/acc f (car xs) (f (car xs)) (cdr xs))]))
Contract violation: argmin violates contract with <
Value 0+1i violates contract real?
An example that triggers this violation:
(argmin (λ (x) 0+1i) (list 0 0))
Finally, SCV analyzes the functional encoding of object-oriented programs effectively.
Zombie is one such example with extensive use of higher-order functions to encode objects
and classes, and the tool can reveal errors buried in delayed function calls. We believe
this is a promising first step for generating classes and objects as counterexamples. In the
example below, we define interface posn/c that accepts twomessages x and y, and function
first-quadrant? that tests whether a position is in the first quadrant. The counterexample
reveals one conforming implementation to interface posn/c that causes error in the module.
(define posn/c
([msg : (one-of/c 'x 'y)]
→ (match msg ['x number?] ['y number?])))
; posn/c → boolean?
(define (first-quadrant? p)
(and (≥ (p 'x) 0) (≥ (p 'y) 0)))
Contract violation: first-quadrant? violates contract with <
Value 0+1i violates contract real?
An example that triggers this violation:
(first-quadrant? (λ (msg) (case msg [(x) 0+1i] [(y) 0])))
Overall, our experiments show that our approach is able to discover and use invariants
implied by conditional flows of control and contract checks. Obfuscations such as multiple
layers of abstractions or complex chains of aliases do not impact precision (a common
shortcoming of flow analysis).
Finally, soft contract verification is more broadly applicable than the systems fromwhich
our benchmarks are drawn, which typically are successful only on their own benchmarks.
For example, type systems such as occurrence typing (Tobin-Hochstadt and Felleisen 2010)
cannot verify any non-trivial contracts, and most soft typing systems do not consider con-
tracts at all. Systems based on higher-order model-checking (Kobayashi et al. 2011), and
dependent refinement types (Terauchi 2010) assume a typed language; encoding our pro-
grams using large disjoint unions produces unverifiable results.
This broad applicability is why we are not able to directly compare SCV to these other
systems across all benchmarks. Instead, the Simple system serves as a benchmark for a
system which does not contain our primary contributions.
4.4 Contract optimization
We also report speedup results for the three most complex programs in our evaluation,
which are interactive games designed for first-year programming courses (Snake, Tetris,
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and Zombie). For each, we recorded a trace of input and timer events while playing the
game, and then used that trace to re-run the game (omitting all graphical rendering) both
with the contracts that we verified, and with the contracts manually removed. Each game
was run 100 times in both modes; the total time is presented below.
Program Contracts On (ms) Contracts Off (ms)
snake 475,799 59
tetris 1,127,591 186
zombie 12,413 1,721
The timing results are quite striking—speedup ranges from over 5x to over 5000x. This
does not indicate, of course, that speedups of these magnitudes are achievable for real
programs. Instead, it shows that programmers avoid the rich contracts we are able to verify,
because of their unacceptable performance overhead. Soft contract verification therefore
enables programmers to write these specifications without the run-time cost.
The difference in timing between Zombie and the other two games is intriguing because
Zombie uses higher-order dependent contracts extensively, along the lines of vec/c from
section 2.6, which intuitively should be more expensive. An investigation reveals that
most of the cost comes from monitoring flat contracts, especially those that apply to data
structures. For example, in Snake, disabling posn/c, a simple contract that checks for a
posn struct with two numeric fields, cuts the run-time by a factor of 4. This contract is
repeatedly applied to every such object in the game. In contrast, higher-order contracts, as
in the object encodings used in Zombie, delay contracts and avoid this repeated checking.
4.5 Limitations and Challenges
We discuss current limitations of our approach and solutions in mitigating them.
First, our approach does not yet give a way to verify deep structural properties expressed
as dependent contracts such as “map over a list preserves the length” or “all elements in
the result of filter satisfy the predicate”, resulting in the false positives seen in table 1.
However, it can already be used to verify many interesting programs because often safety
questions depend only on knowledge of top-level constructors. Examples of these patterns
appear in programs from Kobayashi et al. (2011) for programs such as reverse (see also
§2.5), nil, and mem.
Second, the analysis is prone to combinatorial explosion as inherent in symbolic ex-
ecution. In practice, most conditionals come from case analyses instead of independent
alternatives, and we rely on a precise proof system to eliminate spurious paths. In addition,
we avoid excessive state explosion as in rules Apply-Case-1 and Apply-Case-2 and defer
state splitting until neccessary by encoding the constraint of equal inputs implying equal
outputs during translation. Finally, modularity mitigates the problem further, as modules
tend to be small, and contracts at boundaries help recovering neccessary precision.
Third, the search for counterexamples can be significantly hindered by complex precon-
ditions, where the input is guarded against a deep, inductively defined property. Execution
follows different branches before begin able to generate a valid input to continue verifying
the module. A naive breadth-first search is bogged down by a large frontier resulting from
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different attempts to generate input, most of which are eventually found invalid. Tomitigate
this slow-down, we identify a class of expressions as likely to lead to counterexamples and
prioritize their execution. Specifically, an expression whose innermost contract monitoring
is of a first-order property on a concrete module is likely to reveal a bug.7 In contrast,
expressions in the middle of input generation do not have this form, because the inner-
most contract monitoring isi on the opaque input source. Once the system successfully
instantiates a concrete input and turns the program into this “suspect” form, it focuses on
exploring this branch with that input instead of trying numerous other inputs in parallel.
Using this simple heuristic, we are able to cut the execution time of a module violating the
“braun-tree” invariant from non-terminating after 1 hour down to 2 seconds.
Finally, there is a mismatch in the data-types between the solver’s data-type and Racket’s
rich numeric tower. In particular, Racket supports mixed arithmetic between different types
of numbers up to complex numbers (St-Amour et al. 2012), while Z3’s treatment of numbers
resembles that frommost statically typed languages, and the solver does not performwell in
generating models involving a dynamic restriction of a number’s type. Below is an example
where SCV fails to generate a counterexample:
(f : integer? → integer?)
(define (f n) (/ 1 (+ 1 (* n n))))
In Racket, division is defined on the full numeric tower, and the result of (/ 1 (+ 1 (* n
n))) may not be an integer. In the generated query, this result is an unknown number L of
type Real, and the solver cannot give a model to a constraint set asserting “(not (is_int
L))”. In addition, Racket distinguishes between exact and inexact numbers, where inexact
numbers are floating point approximations. Because Z3 does not reason about floating
points, we currently do not soundly model inexact arithmetic.
5 Related work
In this section, we relate our work to related strands of research: symbolic execution,
random-testing, soft-typing, static contract verification, refinement types, andmodel check-
ing of recursion schemes.
Symbolic execution: Symbolic execution is the idea of running programs with abstract
inputs. Symbolic execution on first-order programs is mature and has been used to find
bugs in real-world programs (Cadar et al. 2006, 2008). Cadar et al. (2006) presents a
symbolic execution engine for C that generates counterexamples of the form of mappings
from addresses to bit-vectors. Later work extends the technique to generate comprehensive
test cases that discover bugs in large programs interacting with the environment (Cadar
et al. 2008).
7 In a symbolic program, the monitored value in this position is usually abstract and covers all values
the module produces
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Random Testing: Random testing is a lightweight technique for finding counterexamples
to program specifications through randomly generated inputs. QuickCheck for Haskell (Cl-
aessen andHughes 2000) proves the approach highly practical in finding bugs for functional
programs. Later works extend random testing to improve code coverage and scale the tech-
nique to more language features such as states and class systems. Heidegger and Thiemann
(2010) use contracts to guide random testing for Javascript, allowing users to annotate
inputs to combine different analyses for increasing the probability of hitting branches with
highly constrained preconditions. Klein et al. (2010) also extend random testing to work
on higher-order stateful programs, discovering many bugs in object-oriented programs
in Racket. Seidel et al. (2015) use refinement types as generators for tests, significantly
improving code coverage.
Our approach is a complement to random testing. By combining symbolic execution with
an SMT solver, the method takes advantage of conditions generated by ordinary program
code and not just user-annotated contracts. In addition, the approach works well with highly
constrained preconditions without further help from users. In contrast, random testing sys-
tems typically require programmers to implement custom generators (Claessen and Hughes
2000) or require user annotations to incorporate a specific analysis collecting all literals in
the program to guide input construction (Heidegger and Thiemann 2010). Type-targeted
testing (Seidel et al. 2015) is more lightweight and does not necessitate an extension to
the existing semantics, but gives no guarantee about completeness, as inherent in random
testing. Even though the tool rules out test cases that fail the pre-conditions, regular code
and post-conditions do not help the test generation process. Our system makes use of both
contracts and regular code to guide the execution to seek inputs that both satisfy pre-
conditions and fail post-conditions. Exploring possible combination of symbolic execution
and random testing for more efficient bug-finding in higher-order programs is our future
work.
Soft typing: Verifying the preconditions of primitive operations can be seen as aweak form
of contract verification and soft typing is a well studied approach to this kind of verifica-
tion (Cartwright and Felleisen 1996). There are two predominant approaches to soft-typing:
one is based on a generalization of Hindley-Milner type inference (Cartwright and Fagan
1991; Wright and Cartwright 1997; Aiken et al. 1994), which views an untyped program as
being embedded in a typed one and attempts to safely eliminate coercions (Henglein 1994).
The other is founded on set-based abstract interpretation of programs (Flanagan et al. 1996;
Flanagan and Felleisen 1999). Both approaches have proved effective for statically check-
ing preconditions of primitive operations, but the approach does not scale to checking pre-
and post-conditions of arbitrary contracts. For example, Soft Scheme (Cartwright and Fagan
1991) is not path-sensitive and does not reason about arithmetic, thus it is unable to verify
many of the occurrence-typing or higher-order recursion scheme examples considered in
the evaluation.
Contract verification: Following in the set-based analysis tradition of soft-typing, there
has been work extending set-based analysis to languages with contracts (Meunier et al.
2006). This work shares the overarching goal of this paper: to develop a static contract
checking approach for components written in untyped languages with contracts. However
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the work fails to capture the control-flow-based type reasoning essential to analyzing un-
typed programs and is unsound (as discussed by Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn (2012)).
Moreover, the set-based formulation is complex and difficult to extend to features consid-
ered here.
Our prior work (Tobin-Hochstadt and Van Horn 2012), as discussed in the introduction,
also performs soft contract verification, but with far less sophistication and success. As our
empirical results show, the contributions of this paper are required to tackle the arithmetic
relations, flow-sensitive reasoning, and complex recursion found in our benchmarks.
An alternative approach has been applied to statically checking contracts in Haskell and
OCaml (Xu 2012; Xu et al. 2009), which is to inline monitors into a program following a
transformation by Findler and Felleisen (2002) and then simplify the program, either using
the compiler, or a specialized symbolic engine equipped with an SMT solver. The approach
would be applicable to untyped languages except for the final step dubbed logicization, a
type-based transformation of program expressions into first-order logic (FOL). A related
approach used for Haskell is to use a denotational semantics that can be mapped into
FOL, which is then model checked (Vytiniotis et al. 2013), but this approach is highly
dependent on the type structure of a program. In contrast, our approach does not assume
a type system to guide the verification process, and therefore verifies run-time type-safety
in addition to richer contracts. Further, these approaches assume a different semantics for
contract checking that monitors recursive calls. This allows the use of contracts as inductive
hypotheses in recursive calls. In contrast, our approach can naturally take advantage of this
stricter semantics of contract checking and type systems, but can also accommodate the
more common and flexible checking policy. Additionally, our approach does not rely on
type information, the lack of which makes these approaches inapplicable to many of our
benchmarks.
Contract verification in the setting of typed, first-order contracts is much more mature.
A prominent example is the work on verifying C# contracts as part of the Code Contracts
project (Fähndrich and Logozzo 2011).
Refinement type checking: Refinement types are an alternative approach to statically
verifying pre- and post-conditions in a higher-order functional language. There are several
approaches to checking type refinements; one is to restrict the computational power of
refinements so that checking is decidable at type-checking time (Freeman and Pfenning
1991); another is to allow unrestricted refinements as in contracts, but to use a solver to
attempt to discharge refinements (Knowles and Flanagan 2010; Rondon et al. 2008; Vazou
et al. 2013). In the latter approach, when a refinement cannot be discharged, some systems
opt to reject the program (Rondon et al. 2008; Vazou et al. 2013), while others such as
hybrid type-checking residualize a run-time check to enforce the refinement (Knowles and
Flanagan 2010), similar to the way soft-typing residualizes primitive pre-condition checks.
Although the end result of our approach closely resembles that of hybrid type checking, we
differ in a few important respects. First, we do not rely on an existing type system. Second,
the method scales straightforwardly to first-class contracts, whereas existing refinement
type systems allow user-defined predicates only for base types and no mechanism for a
dynamically computed mix of flat and higher-order specifications. Third, symbolic ex-
ecution ignores unreachable errors such as those under unreachable lambdas while type
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checking eagerly checks all code. Finally, handling unknown functions on the semantics
side instead of relying on the theory of uninterpreted functions introduces potentially fewer
difficulties in scaling to effectful contracts, and allows straightforward generation of higher-
order counterexamples.8
DJS (Chugh et al. 2012; Chugh et al. 2012) supports expressive refinement specification
and verification for stateful JavaScript programs, including sophisticated dependent spec-
ifications which SCV cannot verify. However, most dependent properties require heavy
annotations. Moreover, null inhabits every object type. Thus the approach cannot give
the same guarantees about programs such as reverse (§2.5) without significantly more
annotation burden. Additionally, it relies on whole program annotation, type-checking, and
analysis.
Model checking higher-order recursion schemes: Much of the recent work on model
checking of higher-order programs relies on the decidability of model checking trees gen-
erated by higher-order recursion schemes (HORS) (Ong 2006). A HORS is essentially a
program in the simply-typed λ -calculus with recursion and finitely inhabited base types that
generates (potentially infinite) trees. Program verification is accomplished by compiling a
program to a HORS in which the generated tree represents program event sequences (Ko-
bayashi 2009b; Kobayashi et al. 2010). This method is sound and complete for the simply
typed λ -calculus with recursion and finite base types, but the gap between this language
and realistic languages is significant. Subsequently, an untyped variant of HORS has been
developed (Tsukada and Kobayashi 2010), which has applications to languages with more
advanced type systems, but despite the name it does not lead to a model checking procedure
for the untyped λ -calculus. A subclass of untyped HORS is the class of recursively typed
recursion schemes, which has applications to typed object-oriented programs (Kobayashi
and Igarashi 2013). In this setting, model checking is undecidable, but relatively complete
with a certain recursive intersection type system (anything typable in this system can be
verified). To cope with infinite data domains such as integers, counter-example guided
abstraction refinement (CEGAR) techniques have been developed (Kobayashi et al. 2011).
The complexity of model checking even for the simply typed case is n-EXPTIME hard
(where n is the rank of the recursion scheme), but progress on decision procedures (Ko-
bayashi and Ong 2009; Kobayashi 2009a) has lead to verification engines that can verify a
number of “small but tricky higher-order functional programs in less than a second.”
In comparison, the HORS approach can verify some specifications which SCV cannot,
but in a simpler (typed) setting, whereas our lightweight method applies to richer languages.
Our approach handles untyped higher-order programs with sophisticated language features
and infinite data domains. Higher-order program invariants may be stated as behavioral
contracts, while the HORS-based systems only support assertions on first order data. Our
work is also able to verify programs with unknown external functions, not just unknown
integer values, which is important for modular program verification, and we are able to
verify many of the small but tricky programs considered in the HORS work.
8 Solvers such as Z3 and CVC4 do not support model generation for higher-order functions
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6 Conclusions and perspective
We have presented a lightweight method and prototype implememtation for static con-
tract checking using a non-standard reduction semantics that is capable of verifying and
falsifying higher-order modular programs with arbitrarily omitted components. Our tool,
SCV, scales to realistic language features such as recursive data structures and modular
programs, and verifies programs written in the idiomatic style of dynamic languages. The
analysis proves the presence and absence of run-time errors without excessive reliance on
programmer help. With zero annotation, SCV already helps programmers find unjustified
usage of partial functions by showing concrete inputs that trigger those errors. With explicit
contracts, programmers can enforce rich specifications to their programs and have the cor-
rect ones optimized away without incurring the significant run-time overhead and incorrect
ones quickly falsified with concrete test cases.
While in this paper, we have addressed the problem of soft contract verification, the tech-
nical tools we have introduced apply beyond this application. For example, a run of SCV
can be seen as a modular program analysis—it soundly predicts which functions are called
at any call site. Moreover it can be composed with whole-program analysis techniques to
derive modular analyses (Van Horn and Might 2010). Adding temporal contracts (Disney
et al. 2011) to our system would produce a model checker for higher-order languages. This
breadth of application follows directly from the semantics-based nature of our approach.
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A Proofs
This section presents proofs for theorems in the paper. Lemmas 2 and 4 prove theorems 3.
Other lemmas support these main ones.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of Counterexamples)
If ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨blameHH ′ , Σn⟩, Σ′ ⊑ Σn, and E ′1 = Σ′(E1) then E ′1 7−→⋆ blameHH ′ .
Proof
First, Σ′ ⊑ Σi for any heap Σi on the trace ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨blameHH ′′ , Σn⟩ (by lemma 6). Next,
if ⟨Ei, Σi⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ei+1, Σi+1⟩, and E ′i ⊑ ⟨Ei, Σ′⟩, then E ′i 7−→ E ′i+1 such that E ′i+1 ⊑ ⟨Ei+1, Σ′⟩
(by lemma 7). Therefore, any fully concrete instantiation of the final heap leads the program
through the same execution trace.
Theorem 2 (Relative Completeness of Counterexamples)
If E ′1 7−→⋆ blameHH ′ , E ′1 ⊑ ⟨E1, Σ1⟩, and there is a complete procedure for generating values
satisfying first-order constraints, then ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨blameHH ′ , Σn⟩ such that we can derive
some Σ′ such that Σ′ ⊑ Σn.
Proof
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The discovery of the error follows from soundness of reduction relation (lemma 2). We
show that the instantiation of the final heap is relatively complete with respect to the un-
derlying solver by induction on the size of Σn.
• If Σn = /0: There is Σ′ = /0 such that /0⊑ /0.
• If Σn = Σn−1[L 7→V ]: 9 Assume there is Σ′n−1 such that Σ′n−1 ⊑ Σn−1.
— If V = •−→C : All constraints in −→C are first-order by construction, which we can
produce a model for by assumption. (In particular, if −→C , any concrete first-order
value can instantiate the unknown value).
— If V = λX .E: Then Σ′n = Σ′n−1[L 7→ λX .E]. By induction hypothesis, for each
address L in E, Σ′n−1(L) properly instantiates Σ(L).
— If V = n: The case is trivial.
Theorem 3 (Verified modules can’t be blamed)
If a module named H is verified in P, then for any concrete program Q for which P is an
abstraction, eval(Q) ̸∋ blameH.
Lemma 1 (Soundness of abstract reduction relation)
If E ′1 ⊑
Σ′1−→
M
⟨E1, Σ1⟩ and E ′1 7−→ E ′2, then ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨E2, Σ2⟩ such that E ′2 ⊑
Σ′2−→
M
⟨E2, Σ2⟩
for some Σ′2 ⊇ Σ′1.
Proof
By case analysis on the derivation of E ′1 7−→ E ′2 and E ′1 ⊑ ⟨E1, Σ1⟩.
• Case E ′1 = (O
−→
V ′1), E1 = (O
−→
V1) and E ′2 = A′1 because δ ( /0,O,
−→
V ′1) ∋ ⟨A′1, /0⟩:
By soundness of δ (lemma 3), ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→ ⟨E2, Σ2⟩ ⊒ E ′2.
• Case E ′1 = ifV ′E ′2E ′f , E1 = ifV E2E f and E ′1 7−→ E ′2 because δ ( /0,zero?,V ′) ∋ ⟨0, /0⟩
By soundness of δ (lemma 3), δ (Σ1,zero?,V )∋ ⟨0, Σ2⟩, so ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→ ⟨E2, Σ2⟩ ⊒
E ′2.
The other case of conditional is similar.
• Case E ′1 = (λX .E ′ V ′x) , E ′2 = [V ′x/X ]E ′ , E1 = (Vf Vx):
— Case Vf = λX .E: then ⟨E2, Σ2⟩ = ⟨[Vx/X ]E, Σ1⟩ ⊒ E ′2.
— CaseVf = L, whereΣ1(L)= •: thenΣ2 =Σ1[L 7→ λX .E] as in ruleApply-Unknown,
and E ′ is of the restricted form approximated by E, so ⟨E2, [Vx/X ]E⟩ ⊒ E ′2.
— Case Vf = L, where Σ1(L) = λX .E: then ⟨E2, Σ2⟩ = ⟨[Vx/X ]E, Σ1⟩ ⊒ E ′2.
• Case E ′1 = monH,H
′
H ′′ (V
′
c ,V
′), E1 = monH,H
′
H ′′ (Vc,V):
— Case δ ( /0,dep?,V ′c) ∋ ⟨0, /0⟩: By soundness of δ (lemma 3), δ (Σ1,dep?,Vc) ∋
⟨0, Σ2⟩. In addition, by soundness of the provability relation (lemma 4), either
both E ′1 and E1 take shortcuts to the result, or both step to the contract checking
form, or E ′1 takes shortcuts and E1 steps to the contract-checking form, which by
lemma 5 eventually steps to the result approximating E ′2.
9 It is straightforward to see that the heap does not contain cycle, by case analysis on the last step of
updating the heap in the reduction relation.
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Other cases are straightforward.
Lemma 2 (Soundness of summarization)
The semantics with summarization using tables Ξ and M is sound with respect to an ex-
tension to the original semantics without these tables with trivial rules for rt and blur
frames:
(rt⟨_,_,_⟩ V) 7−→V
(blur⟨_,_,_⟩ V) 7−→V
If E ′1 ⊑ ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ and E ′1 7−→ E ′2, then ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩ such that E ′2 ⊑
⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩.
Proof
By induction on the derivation of E ′1 ⊑ ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ and case analysis on the reduction
E ′1 7−→ E ′2.
• Case E ′1 ⊑ ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ because E ′1 ⊑ ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ and ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ ∈ S1:
Case analysis on E ′1 7−→ E ′2:
— Sub-case: E ′1 = E ′[λX .E ′ V ′] , E ′2 7−→ E ′[(rt⟨ /0,λX .E ′,V ′⟩ [V ′/X ]E ′)] , and E1 =
E [λX .E V ]:
– If application (λX .E V) is new: ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ β -reduces to ⟨E2, Σ2⟩, and
⟨Ξ1,M1,S1∪{⟨E2, Σ2⟩}⟩
straightforwardly approximates E ′2.
– If application (λX .E V) is a recursive call with a new argument: ⟨Ξ1,M1,ς1⟩
β -reduces with a widened argument, which also straightforwardly approxi-
mates E ′2.
– If application (λX .E V) is a repeated recursive call:
⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ2,M1,S2⟩
where Ξ2 = Ξ1⊔ [⟨Σ0,λX .E,V0⟩ 7→ ⟨F,Σ1,E0,Ek⟩], and some S2 ⊇ S1.
Moreover, we have E = E0[(rt⟨Σ0,λX .E,V0⟩ Ek)], and
E ′ = E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,λX .E ′,V ′0⟩ E
′
k)]
so E ′2 = E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,λX .E ′,V ′0⟩ E
′
k[(rt⟨ /0,λX .E ′,V ′⟩ [V ′/X ]E ′)])].
Because ⟨E0[(rt⟨Σ0,λX .E,V0⟩ Ek[λX .E V ])], Σ1⟩ ∈ S2, it follows from lemma 9
that
E0[(rt⟨Σ0,λX .E,V0⟩ [V0/X ]E)] ∈ S2.
Thus, E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,λX .E ′,V ′⟩ [V ′/X ]E ′)] ⊑ ⟨Ξ2,M1,S2⟩.
Hence, E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,λX .E ′,V ′0⟩ E
′
k[(rt⟨ /0,λX .E ′,V ′⟩ [V ′/X ]E ′)])] ⊑ ⟨Ξ2,M1,S2⟩.
— Other sub-cases are straightforward
• Case E ′1 ⊑ (Ξ1,M1,S1) because:
— E ′1 = E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′0⟩ Ek[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V1⟩ E
′)])]
— E0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′1⟩ E
′)]⊑ ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩
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— Ξ1(Σ0,V,Vx) ∋ ⟨F,Σ1,E0,Ek⟩
— V ′ ⊑ ⟨V, Σ1⟩
— V ′0 ⊑ ⟨Vx, Σ1⟩; V ′1 ⊑ ⟨Vx, Σ1⟩
— E ′0 ⊑ ⟨E0, Σ1⟩; E ′k ⊑ ⟨Ek, Σ1⟩
There are 2 subcases, whether E ′ is a value or can be decomposed into a context and
redex.
— If E ′ is a value V ′a:
This means
E ′1 = E
′
0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′0⟩ E
′
k[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′1⟩ V
′
a)])]
E ′2 = E
′
0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V0⟩ E
′
k[V ′a])].
By lemma 10, there exists ⟨E0[(rt⟨Σ0,V,Vx⟩ Va)], Σ1⟩ ∈ S1 such that
E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′0⟩ V
′
a)]⊑ ⟨E0[(rt⟨Σ0,V,Vx⟩ Va)], Σ1⟩.
Then ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩ such that S2 ∋ ⟨E0[(rt⟨Σ0,V,Vx⟩ Ek[Va])], Σ1⟩,
which approximates E ′2.
— If E ′1 = E ′1[E ′′1 ]:
We have E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′1⟩ E
′
1[E ′′1 ])] 7−→ E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′1⟩ E1[E ′′2 ])].
By induction hypothesis, ⟨Ξ1,M1,S1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩, such that
E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V ′1⟩ E
′
1[E ′′2 ])]⊑ ⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩.
Because Ξ2 ⊇ Ξ1, E ′0[(rt⟨ /0,V ′,V0⟩ E ′kE ′1[E ′′2 ])]⊑ ⟨Ξ2,M2,S2⟩ follows.
Lemma 3 (Soundness of primitive operations)
If E ′ ⊑Σ′1 ⟨E, Σ1⟩,
−→
V ′ ⊑Σ′1 ⟨−→V , Σ1⟩ and δ ( /0,O,
−→
V ′1) ∋ ⟨A′, /0⟩ then δ (Σ1,O,
−→
V1) ∋ ⟨A, Σ2⟩
such that A⊑Σ′2 ⟨A, Σ2⟩ and E ′ ⊑Σ′2 ⟨E, Σ2⟩ for some Σ′2 ⊇ Σ1.
Proof
By inspection of cases of O and
−→
V ′ ⊑ ⟨−→V , Σ1⟩ and consistency of the provability relation
(lemma 4).
Lemma 4 (Consistency of provability relation)
If V ′ ⊑ ⟨V, Σ⟩ and V ′c ⊑ ⟨Vc, Σ⟩ then:
• If /0 ⊢V ′ :V ′c 3 then either Σ ⊢V :Vc3 or Σ ⊢V :Vc ?
• If /0 ⊢V ′ :V ′c 7 then either Σ ⊢V :Vc 7 or Σ ⊢V :Vc ?
• If /0 ⊢V ′ :V ′c ? then Σ ⊢V :Vc ?
Proof
By inspection of cases of V ′ ⊑ ⟨V, Σ⟩ and V ′c ⊑ ⟨Vc, Σ⟩.
Lemma 5 (Soundness of provability relation)
IfV ′⊑⟨V,Σ1⟩,V ′c ⊑⟨Vc,Σ1⟩, /0 ⊢V ′ :V ′c 3 andΣ1 ⊢V :Vc ? then ⟨(VcV),Σ1⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨Va,Σ2⟩
such that δ (Σ2,zero?,Va) ∋ ⟨0, Σ3⟩.
Proof
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By cases of /0 ⊢V ′ :V ′c 3 (where V ′ is concrete) and V ′c ⊑ ⟨Vc, Σ1⟩.
Lemma 6
If Σ′ ⊑ Σ2 and ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→ ⟨E2, Σ2⟩ then Σ′ ⊑ Σ1.
Proof
By case analysis of ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→ ⟨E2, Σ2⟩. The prior heap is either a restriction of Σ2, or
has the same domain, mapping some addresses to more abstract values than Σ2.
Lemma 7 (Completeness of refinement)
If ⟨E1, Σ1⟩ 7−→ ⟨E2, Σ2⟩, Σ′ ⊑ Σ1, Σ′ ⊑ Σ2, and E ′1 ⊑ ⟨E1, Σ′⟩, then E ′1 7−→ E ′2 such that
E ′2 ⊑ ⟨E2, Σ′⟩.
Proof
By case analysis on the reduction step. For each case, the reduction leaves enough refine-
ment on the heap to steer all instantiations to the same path. The case on primitve operations
is deferred to lemma 8
Lemma 8 (Completeness of primitive operations)
If δ (Σ1,O,
−→
V ) ∋ ⟨A, Σ2⟩, Σ′ ⊑ Σ1, Σ′ ⊑ Σ2, and
−→
V ′ ⊑ ⟨−→V , Σ′⟩, then δ ( /0,O,−→V ′) ∋ ⟨A′, /0⟩
such that A′ ⊑ ⟨A, Σ2⟩.
Proof
By inspection of cases of δ .
Lemma 9
If ⟨ /0, /0,{⟨E, /0⟩}⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩ and E [(rt⟨Σ,V f ,Vx⟩ E ′)] ∈ S, then E [(Vf Vx)] ∈ S.
Proof
By induction on ⟨ /0, /0,{⟨E, /0⟩}⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩.
• Case ⟨ /0, /0,{⟨E, /0⟩}⟩ = ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩: We assume programmers cannot write expressions
of the form (rt⟨Σ,V,V ⟩ E). The case holds trivally.
• Case ⟨ /0, /0,{⟨E, /0⟩}⟩ 7−→⋆ ⟨Ξ′,M′,S′⟩ and ⟨Ξ′,M′,S′⟩ 7−→ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩: Case analysis
on the reduction ⟨Ξ′,M′,S′⟩. If the reduction introduces a new frame (rt⟨Σ,V f ,Vx⟩ E)
in S, it must have resulted from the application (Vf Vx) in S′.
Lemma 10
If ⟨E [(rt⟨Σ0,V f ,Vx⟩ V)], Σ⟩ ⊑ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩ where E ̸= E1[(rt⟨_,V f ,_⟩ E2)] for any E1, E2, then
there is ς ∈ S such that ⟨E [(rt⟨Σ0,V f ,Vx⟩ V)], Σ⟩ ⊑ ς
Proof
By case analysis on the derivation
⟨E [(rt⟨Σ0,V f ,Vx⟩ V)], Σ⟩ ⊑ ⟨Ξ,M,S⟩
(only the base case of · ⊑ ⟨·, ·, ·⟩ is applicable).
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Program Lines Checks Correct Variant (ms) Incorrect Variant (ms)
O
cc
ur
re
nc
e
Ty
pi
ng
Ex
am
pl
es
ex-01 6 4 3.3 32.4
ex-02 6 8 3.9 29.4
ex-03 10 12 22.0 57.8
ex-04 11 12 7.8 41.4
ex-05 6 6 4.7 31.4
ex-06 8 11 5.1 32.5
ex-07 8 7 4.7 34.5
ex-08 6 11 7.0 47.2
ex-09 14 12 8.6 32.1
ex-10 6 8 3.5 30.5
ex-11 9 8 6.7 33.3
ex-12 5 11 5.7 31.3
ex-13 9 11 7.5 34.6
ex-14 12 20 8.2 34.4
Total 116 141 98.7 502.8
Table B 1. Logical types for untyped languages benchmarks
Program Lines Checks Correct Variant (ms) Incorrect Variant (ms)
So
ft
Ty
pi
ng
Ex
am
pl
es
append 8 15 22.7 6.4
cpstak 23 15 12,449.6 46.0
flatten 12 24 27.2 37.5
last-pair 7 9 21.1 30.6
last 17 21 35.7 19.0
length-acc 10 14 26.6 8.0
length 8 13 22.7 6.7
member 8 15 23.3 34.9
rec-div2 9 17 22.5 36.1
subst* 11 12 23.1 34.1
tak 12 14 22.7 36.8
taut 9 8 22.2 34.9
Total 134 177 12,719.4 331.0
Table B 2. Soft typing benchmarks
B Detailed evaluation results
This section shows detailed evaluation results for benchmarks collected from different
verification papers. All are done on a Core i7 @ 2.70GHz laptop running Ubuntu 13.10
64bit. Analysis times are averaged over 10 runs.
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Program Lines Checks Correct Variant (ms) Incorrect Variant (ms)
H
ig
he
r-o
rd
er
Re
cu
rs
io
n
Sc
he
m
e
Ex
am
pl
es
intro1 13 11 26.6 208.5
intro2 13 11 27.7 210.2
intro3 13 12 30.6 48.0
sum 9 12 100.4 200.4
mult 9 20 188.6 221.2
max 14 11 35.7 220.2
mc91 8 15 169.6 (1) 115.5
ack 9 16 15.8 205.5
repeat 11 11 10.1 39.7
fhnhn 18 15 38.6 64.4
fold-div 18 34 289.0 250.2
hrec 9 13 21.8 214.1
neg 20 15 95.4 255.4
l-zipmap 16 31 483.0 (1) 152.9
hors 25 17 56.8 58.4
r-lock 17 19 75.3 90.1
r-file 50 62 84.3 118.7
reverse 11 28 20.6 288.5
isnil 9 17 14.9 9.6
mem 12 28 28.2 545.0
nth0 15 27 24.2 806.6
zip 14 42 268.1 688.2
a-max 18 33 528 294.1
fold-fun-list 20 32 70.5 543.2
fold-left 14 27 2028.4 (1) 145.5
fold-right 14 27 2468.5 (1) 184.1
forall-leq 13 23 21 335
harmonic 14 26 381.6 101.2
length 13 24 14.5 (1) 104.4
map-filter 21 51 2083.1 (1) 399.3
risers 26 61 38.9 267.3
search 14 26 2386.5 (1) 28.1
zip-unzip 27 62 2064.4 (1) 758.8
Total 527 859 14,190.7 (8) 8,172.3
Table B 3. Higher-order model checking benchmarks
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Program Lines Checks Correct Variant Incorrect Variant
D
ep
.T
yp
eI
nf
.
boolflip 10 17 10.5 38.8
mult-all 10 18 9.2 532.8
mult-cps 12 20 348.1 52.3
mult 10 17 102.9 36.9
sum-acm 10 15 41.1 1,132.3
sum-all 9 15 8.9 442.1
sum 8 14 9.0 35.5
Total 69 116 529.7 2,270.7
Table B 4. Dependent type checking benchmarks
Program Lines Checks Correct Variant Incorrect Variant
Sy
m
bo
lic
Ex
ec
ut
io
n
Ex
am
pl
es
all 9 16 23.0 23.2
even-odd 10 11 102.7 20.3
factorial-acc 10 9 16.3 7.0
factorial 7 8 13.1 5.9
fibonacci 7 11 1,345.7 97.3
filter-sat-all 11 18 2,053.3 (1) 23.1
filter 11 17 24.5 37.6
foldl1 9 17 22.0 22.2
foldl 8 10 22.6 22.4
foldr1 9 11 22.3 21.1
foldr 8 10 27.0 23.1
ho-opaque 10 14 19.1 19.9
id-dependent 8 3 4.5 17.6
insertion-sort 14 30 57.6 54.9
map-foldr 11 20 24.2 24
mappend 11 31 29.7 26.9
map 10 13 23.9 23.7
recip-contract 7 9 4.4 4.1
recip 8 15 5.7 5.5
rsa 14 5 17.7 25.1
sat-7 20 12 5647.7 101.8
sum-filter 11 18 25.0 27.1
web (22) 158 213 268.6 -
web (110) 778 1,336 - 14,126.9 (5)
Total 1,159 1,857 9800.6 (1) 14,760.7 (5)
G
am
es snake 164 246 38,602.3 3,034.2
tetris 267 338 12,303.5 2,255.0
zombie 249 476 21,276.2 1,152.0
Total 680 1,060 72,182.0 6,441.2
Table B 5. Higher-order symbolic execution benchmarks
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